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STAKEHOLDERISM, CORPORATE PURPOSE, AND CREDIBLE
COMMITMENT
Lisa M. Fairfax*
One of the most significant recent phenomena in corporate governance
is the embrace, by some of the most influential actors in the corporate
community, of the view that corporations should be focused on
furthering the interests of all corporate stakeholders as well as the
broader society. This stakeholder vision of corporate purpose is not
new. Instead, it has emerged in cycles throughout corporate law
history. However, for much of that history—including recent history—
the consensus has been that stakeholderism has not achieved
dominance or otherwise significantly influenced corporate behavior.
That honor is reserved for the corporate purpose theory that focuses on
shareholders and profit. Thus, many view the most recent embrace of
stakeholderism as empty rhetoric. In light of this view, and the
relatively fickle history of allegiance to stakeholderism, this Article
seeks to explore whether we can expect that this most recent resurgence
of stakeholderism will be different and hence whether we can expect
that corporate actors will work to ensure that their corporations are
governed in a way that benefits all stakeholders.
Relying on the theory of credible commitment—a theory focused on
predicting whether economic actors will comply with their promises—
this Article argues that there are considerable obstacles to achieving
stakeholderism. This Article first argues that there are some reasons
for optimism that this most recent embrace of stakeholderism will
translate into reality. Second, and despite that optimism, this Article
draws upon credible commitment theory to argue that it is unlikely that
stakeholderism will have a lasting impact on corporate conduct unless
corporations make a credible commitment to operating in a way that
advances stakeholder interests and a broader social purpose. Third,
this Article not only highlights the significant credible commitment
* Presidential Professor, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Special thanks to
Elizabeth Pollman, Jill Fisch, Anita Allen, Dorothy Roberts, Tom Baker, Veronica Root
Martinez, Usha Rodrigues, Kristin Johnson, Guy Charles, Gina-Gail Fletcher, Kevin Davis,
Andrew Schwartz, and Shaun Ossei-Owusu for their comments and perspectives on earlier
versions of this draft. All errors, of course, are mine.

1163

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1164

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1163

challenges posed by efforts to pursue a stakeholder-related corporate
purpose, but it also reveals significant concerns with the ability of
prevailing reforms to overcome those challenges. Nevertheless, this
Article argues that these concerns do not necessarily doom to failure
the credible commitment effort. Instead, relying on the too often
overlooked emphasis credible commitment theory places on norms, this
Article insists that the collection of governance mechanisms aimed at
achieving credible commitment, even if flawed, may facilitate norm
internalization in a manner that increases the likelihood that corporate
actors will align their behaviors with stakeholderism.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant recent phenomena in corporate governance
is the outspoken embrace of the view that corporations should operate in
a manner that benefits society and all of the corporations’ stakeholders.1
This Article refers to this view of corporate purpose as stakeholderism.2
This recent embrace of stakeholderism is best captured by two of the most
1
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, The History and Revival of the Corporate Purpose Clause,
99 Tex. L. Rev 1423, 1447–51 (2021) [hereinafter Pollman, History and Revival]; Colin
Mayer, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater Good 5–7, 9 (2018) (proposing that
corporations be legally required to articulate a purpose); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto
Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91, 124–26
(2020) (discussing reactions reflecting belief that focus on social purpose represented a
“significant turning point”); Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals,
106 Va. L. Rev. 937, 939 (2020) (discussing trends toward firms pursuing social goals); Jill
E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 Tex. L. Rev.
1309, 1309–11 (2021) [hereinafter Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?];
Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG and Compliance, in The Cambridge
Handbook of Compliance 662, 662–63 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2021).
2
See infra note 146 (explaining other labels used to refer to stakeholder-centered view of
corporate purpose).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1166

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1163

influential actors in the business community. In 2018, Larry Fink, the
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of BlackRock, Inc. (“BlackRock”), the
world’s largest shareholder and asset manager,3 posted a letter to CEOs
proclaiming that corporations had an obligation to make a “positive
contribution to society.”4 Fink asserted that corporations should be
operated with a view towards benefitting all stakeholders as well as the
broader community.5 In 2019, Fink reiterated these sentiments,
proclaiming that corporations need to have purpose and that “[p]urpose is
not the sole pursuit of profits but the animating force for achieving
them.”6
Along these same lines, in 2019, the Business Roundtable, the nation’s
leading nonprofit association of chief executives and directors, released a
statement signed by 181 CEOs, expressing a commitment to embracing a
corporate purpose that included a “fundamental commitment” to deliver
value to all of the corporations’ stakeholders.7 The Business Roundtable
made clear that its statement was aimed at “[r]edefin[ing]” corporate
purpose to promote “an economy that serves all Americans.”8 A 2020
Fortune survey revealed that sixty-three percent of CEOs surveyed
agreed with the Business Roundtable statement.9
3

See The Rise of BlackRock, Economist (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.economist.com/leader
s/2013/12/05/the-rise-of-blackrock [https://perma.cc/CVY2-R373]; Liam Kennedy, Top 500
Asset Managers 2021, IPE (June 2021), https://www.ipe.com/reports/top-500-asset-ma
nagers-2021/10053128.article [https://perma.cc/8M8U-3YTX] (identifying BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street as three of the largest asset managers).
4
See Larry Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose [hereinafter Fink, 2018 Letter],
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/HU35-78YS] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
5
See id.
6
Larry Fink, 2019 Letter to CEOs: Purpose and Profit [hereinafter Fink, 2019 Letter],
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/Y3NB-JSA7] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
7
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy
that Serves All Americans,’ Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Business
Roundtable Statement], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefinesthe-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/XJS9-TTR4].
8
Id.
9
See Ira T. Kay, Chris Brindisi, Blaine Martin, Soren Meischeid & Gagan Singh, The
Stakeholder Model and ESG: Assessing Readiness and Design Implications for Executive
Incentive Metrics – A Conceptual Approach, PayGovernance (Sept. 1, 2020), https://w
ww.paygovernance.com/viewpoints/the-stakeholder-model-and-esg [https://perma.cc/K2JFWAZZ]; Alan Murray & David Meyer, The Pandemic Widens Rifts; Businesses Need to Help
Heal Them, Fortune (May 11, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/05/11/coronavirus-pandemicstakeholder-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/53H3-P39R].
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There are certainly reasons to be skeptical about the potential impact
of this statement. First, we have been here before.10 The concept of a
corporate purpose focused on stakeholders and social purpose is far from
new. As early as 1932, Columbia Law Professor Merrick Dodd insisted
that the corporation must serve a community of interests, including
employees, creditors, and the broader society, and that the corporation
should behave in a socially responsible manner.11 Moreover, throughout
the history of corporate law, various scholars and corporate actors have
advanced the view that corporations have an obligation to be socially
responsible and serve the interests of all stakeholders impacted by the
corporation’s activities, including shareholders, non-shareholders, and
the broader community.12 Despite these periods, many scholars
consistently and vehemently insist that “shareholder primacy,” which
maintains that the corporation’s purpose is to maximize profits to its
shareholders,13 should serve as the primary guide for how corporate
10
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in
Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 Bus.
Law. 397, 411–15 (2021) [hereinafter Strine, Restoration] (discussing origins of social
purpose debate).
11
See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1145, 1147–48, 1161 (1932).
12
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 409, 432 (2002) [hereinafter Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good];
Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on
Corporate Norms, 31 J. Corp. L. 675, 690–98 (2006) [hereinafter Fairfax, Rhetoric of
Corporate Law] (noting proliferation of social purpose and social responsibility rhetoric in
corporate documents and throughout the business community); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 280–81 (1999);
William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 180, 208–15 (1992) (outlining the “entity theory” of corporation); Timothy L. Fort,
The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory
and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 173, 184–86 (1997) (detailing
stakeholder theory); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 91–96 (2002)
(discussing the debate on corporate social responsibility sparked by Dodd’s 1932 article).
13
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 8–9 (1932); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 33, 126 (stating that corporate executives
are employees of shareholders). For a discussion of more recent supporters of shareholder
maximization, see, for example, Sanjai Bhagat & Glenn Hubbard, Should the Modern
Corporation Maximize Shareholder Value?, AEI Econ. Perspectives, Sept. 1, 2020, at 1, 3–4
and Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 94–95. See also Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing
Good, supra note 12, at 430–31 (discussing shareholder primacy theory); Edward B. Rock,
For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus.
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agents govern their corporation.14 This includes scholars who believe
that stakeholderism is more appropriate.15 The very fact that we have
been here before, and that scholars continue to dismiss stakeholderism,
suggests reason for skepticism about whether the promises contained in
stakeholderism will be realized. A second reason for skepticism is the fact
that many corporations, including those who signed the Business
Roundtable commitment, have a history related to socially responsible
acts that is questionable at best.
This history, coupled with the historically fickle nature of the embrace
of stakeholderism, begs an important question: Can we really expect that
the most recent embrace of stakeholderism will translate into real change
in corporate behavior? This Article answers that question by drawing on
insights from the theory of credible commitment. The theory of credible
commitment is an ideal lens through which to explore the viability of
stakeholderism because it is aimed at exploring the extent to which
individuals will honor the promises they make in an economic
exchange.16
With credible commitment theory as a backdrop, this Article makes
four important claims. This Article begins by acknowledging reasons to
be skeptical about the impact of the most recent embrace of
stakeholderism on corporate behavior. Nonetheless, this Article first
contends that the type of corporate actors involved in this most recent
embrace, coupled with socially conscious stakeholders’ growing ability
to influence corporate reputation and bottom line through their use of
twenty-first century public and social media platforms, may be influential
enough to offer a genuine opportunity to turn the corner, thus setting the
stage for corporations to genuinely make efforts to operate in a manner
that advances the interests of all stakeholders.
Second, however, this Article argues that unless corporations make a
credible commitment to ensuring that corporations will focus on other
stakeholders, it is not likely that corporations will be able to seize this
opportunity so that it translates into a genuine shift in corporate attitude
and behavior, particularly in the medium and long-term. In advancing this
Law. 363, 363–67, 375 (2021) [hereinafter Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed?]
(detailing various perspectives on stakeholderism).
14
See Henry Hansmann, How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. Corp. L. 745, 746 (2006);
Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 690.
15
See Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 682.
16
See infra Part II (describing credible commitment theory).
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argument, this Article draws from credible commitment theory to remind
us that the realities of the economic environment along with the nature of
economic promises mean that we cannot simply assume that corporations
will be incentivized to adhere to their commitments, even if we assume
they are acting in good faith when they make those commitments. In other
words, this Article reminds us why corporate commitments have
credibility problems.
Third, this Article not only argues that there are significant challenges
to credible commitment in the context of stakeholderism but also
questions whether available corporate governance mechanisms can
overcome these challenges. In so doing, this Article sketches out a
typology of factors necessary to facilitate credible commitment, and
through the lens of this typology, demonstrates the manner in which
prevailing credible commitment vehicles, even if reformed, may fall short
of addressing those factors.
However, this Article argues that this demonstration does not doom
credible commitment in this area to failure. To be sure, several prominent
scholars have concluded that the kind of credible commitment flaws
highlighted in this Article render efforts to actualize stakeholderism
infeasible.17 This Article rejects that conclusion. Instead, this Article
argues that such a conclusion fails to account for the emphasis credible
commitment theorists place on informal constraints in the form of norms
and thus fails to account for the possibility that the cumulative effect of
reforming foundational governance mechanisms may serve a very
important normative function.18 This Article uses the term “norm” to refer
to expectations regarding how individuals ought to behave.19 Social
science and empirical research reveal that norms can have a significant
impact on behavior because individuals feel pressure to align their
17

See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 147; Rock, For Whom is the Corporation
Managed?, supra note 13, at 391–95 (noting factors that complicate implementing a regime of
stakeholder primacy); Dorothy S. Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 Colum. L.
Rev. 1617, 1619–21 (2021).
18
See infra Part IV.
19
For general discussion of the meaning of the term “norm,” see Cristina Bicchieri, Norms
in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure and Change Social Norms 28–32 (2017) [hereinafter
Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild]; Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and
Dynamics of Social Norms 29 (2006) [hereinafter Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society]; Eric
A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 5 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms]; Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the
New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1656–57 (1996).
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behavior with prevailing norms.20 While external pressures such as those
embedded in formal rules and legal constraints associated with corporate
governance vehicles can ensure norm compliance, norms have the
greatest chance of influencing behavior when they are internalized.21 This
is because when norm internalization occurs, individuals comply with the
norm irrespective of formal rules, legal enforcement, or other forms of
external pressure.22 While the process of norm internalization is inexact,
consistent and repeated exposure to norms, the credibility and legitimacy
of normative sources, and the visibility of the norm can all contribute to
the process of norm internalization.23 Based on these insights, this Article
argues that the collection of governance mechanisms aimed at achieving
credible commitment, even if flawed, will be instrumental in facilitating
norm internalization in a manner that increases the potential for corporate
actors to align their behaviors with stakeholderism.
From this perspective, credible commitment theory suggests that while
these reforms may not be an end, they may facilitate a means to an end.
That is, their cumulative effect may be to increase the likelihood that
individual corporate actors will believe that they ought to embrace
stakeholderism, thereby increasing the likelihood that such actors will
seek to engage in behaviors that align with such embrace—even or
especially when external actors are not around to pressure them to do so.
Part I of this Article highlights the most recent embrace of
stakeholderism and then articulates reasons for skepticism and optimism
related to that embrace. Part II introduces the theory of credible
commitment and demonstrates why credible commitment is necessary to
actualize stakeholderism. Part II then draws upon credible commitment
theory to advance a typology of factors that hinder credible commitment.
Finally, Part II utilizes that typology to illustrate how the significant
challenges associated with credible commitment apply to corporate
behavior in general and to behavior focused on stakeholders in particular.
In light of this illustration, Part III begins by identifying the set of
factors necessary for overcoming credible commitment challenges to
stakeholderism. Part III concludes by surfacing several flaws with
prevailing credible commitment reforms and pinpointing the difficulties
with overcoming those flaws.
20

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
22
See infra Section IV.B.
23
See infra Part IV.
21
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Despite this conclusion, Part IV redeems the collection of proffered
reforms by demonstrating that they can play a role in facilitating credible
commitment through increasing the potential for norm internalization,
and thus opening a pathway for altering corporate behavior in favor of
stakeholderism in a manner that does not rely on formal rules and
constraints. Part IV then addresses important limitations and concerns
associated with this norm internalization exercise. Part V concludes.
Credible commitment theory demonstrates that credible commitments
are an essential component to any economic promise, thereby
highlighting the importance of credible commitment to the promises
embedded in stakeholderism. That theory also highlights the difficulty of
credibly committing to stakeholderism and raises serious concerns about
whether reforms can combat those difficulties. Viewed from this lens,
credible commitment theory appears to confirm the skepticism with
which many have greeted this new wave of stakeholder rhetoric.
However, this Article concludes with a note of optimism. It is entirely
possible that the collection of mechanisms aimed at reforming core
aspects of our governance system can facilitate credible commitment by
altering the normative expectations that guide corporate behavior, paving
the way for corporations to make real on their promise to focus on all of
their stakeholders.
I. ONCE AGAIN, STAKEHOLDERISM
A. The Rise in Rhetoric
In 2018, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink made headlines with the entire
business community when he posted his annual letter to CEOs stipulating
the expectation that corporations focus on social purpose, stakeholders,
and the broader community.24 Fink explained his view as follows:
[T]he public expectations of your company have never been greater.
Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a
social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must not only
deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive
contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their

24

See Fink, 2018 Letter, supra note 4.
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stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the
communities in which they operate.25

Emphasizing the need to focus on all stakeholders, Fink further asked
this set of questions:
Companies must ask themselves: What role do we play in the
community? How are we managing our impact on the environment?
Are we working to create a diverse workforce? Are we adapting to
technological change? Are we providing the retraining and
opportunities that our employees and our business will need to adjust
to an increasingly automated world? Are we using behavioral finance
and other tools to prepare workers for retirement, so that they invest in
a way that will help them achieve their goals?26

Fink doubled down on these sentiments in his next annual letter to
CEOs, noting that corporations need to have purpose and that “[p]urpose
is not the sole pursuit of profits but the animating force for achieving
them.”27
Mirroring Fink’s views, other institutional investors have embraced the
view that corporations should focus on issues beyond shareholders and
profit. Both State Street Global Advisors, Inc. and The Vanguard Group,
the other two of the largest asset managers,28 have also insisted that
corporations should be managed with a view towards enhancing the
interests of all of their stakeholders.29 Thus, both groups have
emphasized the importance of engaging with non-shareholder
stakeholders such as employees and suppliers as well as the importance
of addressing broader societal concerns such as supporting local
communities and being mindful of environmental issues.30 In the words

25

Id.
Id.
27
See Fink, 2019 Letter, supra note 6.
28
See Kennedy, supra note 3.
29
See State Street, 2016 Corporate Responsibility Report 4 (2016), http://www.statestreet.c
om/content/dam/statestreet/documents/values/StateStreet_2016_CorporateResponsiblityRep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC3G-LJZS] (emphasizing the importance of creating value for
clients and shareholders, engaging employees and suppliers, and supporting communities and
the environment); David M. Silk, Sabastian V. Niles & Carmen X.W. Lu, ESG, Sustainability,
and CSR: Governance and the Role of the Board, in The Lawyer’s Corporate Social
Responsibility Deskbook: Practical Guidance for Corporate Counsel and Law Firms 9, 11
(Alan S. Gutterman, Margaret M. Cassidy, Travis Miller & Ashley C. Walter eds., 2019).
30
See supra note 29.
26
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of the former CEO of Vanguard, “By taking a broader, more complete
view of corporate purpose, boards can focus on creating long-term
value, better serving everyone—investors, employees, communities,
suppliers and customers.”31 Consistent with these sentiments from the
leading institutional investors, studies reveal that a large number of
institutional shareholders have begun to profess a commitment to
stakeholderism and thus a belief that corporations should be run in a
manner that enhances the interests of all stakeholders while being
mindful of the broader community and societal concerns.32 In this
regard, there appears to be a groundswell of institutional shareholders
embracing stakeholderism.
Activist shareholders also have begun to embrace the view that
corporations should focus broadly on delivering value to all of their
stakeholders.33 Shareholder activists such as ValueAct Capital, JANA
Partners, and Blue Harbor have announced plans to align their investment
priorities with a focus on social and environmental factors.34 This
announcement is remarkable not only because activist shareholders are
often viewed as caring only about the financial bottom line but also
because they are perceived as willing to discard the interests of other
stakeholders in pursuit of financial gain.35 The fact that activist
shareholders are also embracing stakeholderism highlights the emerging
consensus around the importance of stakeholderism.

31

See Corporations’ New Purpose—To Serve All Stakeholders Not Just Shareholders,
Indus. Week (Aug. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Industry Week], https://www.industryweek.com/
leadership/article/22028107/corporations-new-purpose-to-serve-all-stakeholders-not-just-sha
reholders [https://perma.cc/A4GD-XLGC] (quoting Bill McNabb, former CEO of Vanguard)
(“[I]t seems the corporate world is all in.”).
32
See Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution [https://perma.cc/C9AU-G5M5] (finding that
ESG issues were “almost universally” at the top of the minds of executives of some fortythree global institutional shareholders, and thus such investors were taking “meaningful steps”
to integrating sustainability issues into their investment criteria). The article also noted that
from 2006–2018, the number of investors agreeing to incorporate ESG issues into their
investment decisions grew from 63 to 1,715. See id.
33
See Silk et al., supra note 29, at 11; Thomas Franck, Social and Sustainable Investing
Gets a Boost from an Unlikely Source: Wall Street Activists, CNBC (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/27/social-investing-gets-a-boost-from-an-unlikely-source-ac
tivists.html [https://perma.cc/WX8Q-56PR].
34
See Silk et al., supra note 29, at 11; Eccles & Klimenko, supra note 32.
35
See Franck, supra note 33 (noting that shareholder activists were “once known for pushing
for extreme cost-cutting or just about anything that would boost the bottom line”).
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Further highlighting this consensus, major corporations and their
leaders have aligned themselves with stakeholderism. In August 2019,
Business Roundtable, the nation’s leading nonprofit association of chief
executives, released a statement in which it affirmatively noted that it was
“mov[ing] away from shareholder primacy” and towards a “commitment
to all stakeholders.”36 The statement expressed a “fundamental”
commitment by the 181 CEOs who signed the statement to lead
companies for the benefit of all stakeholders. Importantly, the statement
pledged to deliver value to customers, invest in employees (including
fostering diversity and inclusion), deal fairly and ethically with suppliers,
support communities (including protecting the environment by embracing
sustainable practices throughout businesses), and generate long-term
value for shareholders.37 The statement ended with the following:
Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all
of them, for the future success of our companies, our communities and
our country.38

CEOs of the corporations who signed the commitment have spoken
individually about the importance of the commitment and their support
for stakeholderism.39 For example, Johnson & Johnson’s CEO stated that
the statement “affirms the essential role corporations can play in
improving our society.”40 The CEO of Progressive Corp. noted that “the
best-run companies do more” than “generate profits and return value to
shareholders”; those companies “put the customer first and invest in their
employees and communities.”41
Beyond the Business Roundtable statement, other influential groups
have gravitated towards stakeholderism. On the heels of the Business
Roundtable statement, the World Economic Forum issued a manifesto
essentially denouncing shareholder primacy and urging companies to
adopt a model of corporate purpose aimed at serving the interests of all

36

Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 7.
See id.
38
Id.
39
See Industry Week, supra note 31.
40
Id.
41
Id.
37
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stakeholders.42 The manifesto proclaimed that the “purpose of a company
is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation.”43
B. Stakeholderism as Aligned with For-Profit Purpose
In embracing stakeholderism, all of the aforementioned corporate
actors not only profess a belief that stakeholderism aligns with the most
appropriate way to operate a for-profit corporation but also insist that it is
more appropriate than shareholder primacy.44 That is, they insist that
stakeholderism is more consistent with the desire to generate better
returns and support the long-term health of the corporation than
shareholder primacy.45 Commenting on the importance of the Business
Roundtable statement, Jamie Dimon, the CEO and Chair of JPMorgan
Chase & Co., insisted that corporations had embraced the statement
“because they know it is the only way to be successful over the long
term.”46 Johnson & Johnson’s CEO stated that a corporate purpose
focused on delivering value to all stakeholders “better reflects the way
corporations can and should operate.”47 The president of the Ford
Foundation insisted that businesses needed to focus on “generating longterm value for all stakeholders” in order to ensure “prosperity and
sustainability for both business and society.”48 Along these same lines,
the CEO of Progressive Corp. stated: “In the end, it’s the most promising
way to build long-term value.”49 From this perspective, advocates of
stakeholderism have made clear their belief that stakeholderism is entirely
consistent with the goals of a for-profit corporation and is a more

42
Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution, World Econ. F. (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/age
nda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-indus
trial-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/UA89-UYGJ].
43
Id.
44
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1310
(noting that the corporate purpose debate is an “effort to reorient corporate decision-making
away from economic value maximization in favor of broader societal objectives”).
45
See Franck, supra note 33; Industry Week, supra note 31 (noting industry leaders’
emphasis on the positive impact of the commitment on long-term value creation).
46
See Lila MacLellan, Nearly 200 CEOs Just Agreed on an Updated Definition of “the
Purpose of a Corporation,” Quartz (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/video/nearly200-ceos-just-agreed-140249549.html [https://perma.cc/C5WH-EFKZ] (quoting Dimon).
47
See Industry Week, supra note 31.
48
See id.
49
See id.
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appropriate mechanism for achieving those goals than shareholder
primacy.
These corporate actors also appeared to be expressing a belief that
corporations can achieve stakeholderism within the traditional for-profit
corporation. To be sure, in recent years alternative entities have emerged
aimed at enabling economic actors to advance the interests of other
stakeholders. For example, the benefit corporation is a new and
increasingly popular corporate form that seeks to enable corporations to
advance social objectives alongside profit goals.50 Certainly some have
suggested that the best mechanism for achieving stakeholderism is
through opting into a benefit corporation statute. However, the Business
Roundtable statement, and the sentiments expressed by actors supporting
that statement, appears to suggest that corporations can achieve
stakeholderism without resorting to changing the corporate form. Hence
this Article focuses on whether this suggestion is credible.
C. Reasons for Skepticism
1. The Fickle Road of Stakeholder Rhetoric
One of the primary reasons for skepticism is the fact that we have heard
these kinds of sentiments throughout the history of corporate law, but they
never seem to gain significant traction or lasting acceptance. Indeed, the
sentiments reflected in stakeholderism are far from new.51 There has been
a long-standing debate in corporate law about corporate purpose.52 On
50
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The “Value” of a Public Benefit
Corporation, in Research Handbook on Corporate Purpose and Personhood 68, 68–69
(Elizabeth Pollman & Robert B. Thompson eds., 2021) [hereinafter Fisch & Solomon,
“Value” of a Public Benefit Corporation]; Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit
Corporations?, 42 Del. J. Corp. L. 77, 79–81 (2017); Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing
Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority
of a Specific Public Benefit, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 1749, 1765 (2017).
51
See Nell Minow, Six Reasons We Don’t Trust the New “Stakeholder” Promise from the
Business Roundtable, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Sept. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.la
w.harvard.edu/2019/09/02/six-reasons-we-dont-trust-the-new-stakeholder-promise-from-thebusiness-roundtable/ [https://perma.cc/Y9UM-Z2PZ] (“We’ve seen this before.”).
52
See Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 676; Fairfax, Doing Well While
Doing Good, supra note 12, at 430–33; Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They
Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory
of the Corporation, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1195, 1195 (1999) (noting that the corporate purpose
question has been debated “ad nauseum”); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception
of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 264–66 (1992) (explaining the
competing conceptions of corporate purpose).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Stakeholderism & Credible Commitment

1177

one side of the debate are those who subscribe to the more conventional
“shareholder primacy” view of the corporation and its purpose,
contending that the corporation exists to maximize profits to its
shareholders.53 On the other side of the debate are those who embrace the
view that corporations should focus on the interests of all of its
stakeholders.54 This debate has animated corporate law for decades.
Many trace the genesis of this debate to the 1930s dialogue between
Harvard Law Professor Adolf Berle and Columbia Law School Professor
Merrick Dodd.55 Relying on the notion that corporate officers and
directors hold shareholders’ property in trust, Professor Berle insisted that
the proper purpose of a corporation was to maximize shareholders’
property interest, i.e., their profits.56 Professor Dodd vehemently
disagreed, insisting that corporate officers and directors were trustees for
the corporate enterprise as a whole.57 As a result, those officers and
directors have an obligation not only to focus on the concerns of all of the
stakeholders within that enterprise but also to engage in socially
responsible endeavors.58
Modern versions of this debate abound.59 Thus, scholars such as
Stephen Bainbridge, Lucian Bebchuk, Henry Hansmann, and Edward
Rock contend that corporations should focus primarily on shareholders

53
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 430; Berle & Means, supra
note 13, at 8–9 (referring to shareholders as “owner[s]” and noting that corporate governance
must focus on the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control); Friedman,
supra note 13, at 33.
54
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 432; see also Bratton, supra
note 12, at 208–15 (discussing entity theory); Fort, supra note 12, at 184–86 (detailing
stakeholder theory); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate
Social Responsiveness, 25 J. Corp. L. 41, 54 (1999) (explaining popularity of stakeholder
theory); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1443,
1465–69 (1994) (noting stakeholder theory).
55
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 436–37 (describing the
debate); Dodd, supra note 11, at 1147–48.
56
A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1049 (1931)
(“[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at
all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders . . . .”).
57
Dodd, supra note 11, at 1160–61.
58
Id.
59
See Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 681–82.
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and maximizing profit.60 Milton Friedman famously stated that “[t]he
[s]ocial [r]esponsibility [o]f [b]usiness [i]s to [i]ncrease [i]ts [p]rofits.”61
In his treatise, Professor Robert Clark argued that corporate purpose
involves the relationship between shareholders and directors and
officers.62 By sharp contrast, many others such as Cynthia Williams, Kent
Greenfield, and Lynne Dallas have embraced a conception of corporate
purpose that focuses on attending to the interests of all corporate
constituents.63 Professors Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair have advanced
a “team production” theory of the corporation which embraces the view
that corporations have a responsibility to balance the concerns of all
corporate stakeholders.64 This theory substantially contributed to the
ongoing debate about the most appropriate corporate purpose norm.
Despite this debate, corporate scholars have almost universally agreed
that shareholder primacy has been the victor in this debate.65 In 2005,
Professor Henry Hansmann insisted that there was “increasing consensus
among the relevant actors[] around the globe” that a corporate purpose
focused on shareholders represented “the most attractive social ideal for
the organization.”66 Even scholars who prefer the social purpose theory
grudgingly admit that shareholder primacy has dominated the corporate
governance landscape.67 As one commentator noted, even though
shareholder primacy “has always had skeptics,” “[s]hareholder primacy
has been the core operating principle of public companies for about 50

60
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423–25 (1993); see supra notes 13,
14.
61
Friedman, supra note 13, at 32.
62
Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 30 (1986).
63
See Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at 413 (discussing list of scholars focused on
stakeholder concerns); Jill E. Fisch, Keith L. Johnson & Cynthia A. Williams, Why Corporate
Sustainability Disclosure Has Become a Mainstream Demand, NYU L. 11–12,
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Corporate%20Sustainability%20Disclosure%20b
y%20Fisch%20Johnson%20Williams%209.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV6T-XCWV] (last
visited Apr. 12, 2022); Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle
and Means, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 19, 19–25 (1988).
64
Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 281 (describing directors as “mediating hierarchs whose
job is to balance team members’ competing interests in a fashion that keeps . . . the productive
coalition . . . together”).
65
See Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 682.
66
Hansmann, supra note 14, at 746.
67
See Fairfax, Rhetoric of Corporate Law, supra note 12, at 682, 690.
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years.”68 Consistently, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita
note that despite the recurring debate around purpose, shareholder
primacy represented the dominant corporate purpose theory at the turn of
the twenty-first century.69 The fact that stakeholderism has emerged
throughout history without appearing to gain any dominance is cause for
skepticism about the viability of the most recent embrace. From this
perspective, it is no surprise that in response to the Business Roundtable
statement, corporate law scholars discounted it, with one referring to the
statement as “thankfully” just empty rhetoric.70
To be sure, the emerging support for stakeholderism has sparked yet
another debate about the most appropriate corporate purpose. Thus, in the
months after its publication, scholarly voices have emerged in support of
the Statement and the corresponding embrace of stakeholderism.71 Colin
Mayer has written a book advocating that corporations be legally required
to articulate a socially responsible corporate purpose.72 Alex Edmans’
recent book echoes the sentiments in the Business Roundtable statement,
arguing that corporations should focus on a purpose that creates value for
all of society.73 However, there is also a growing number of scholarly
critiques of the statement, aligning with the sentiment that it reflects
empty rhetoric and that it is normatively undesirable.74 Those who view
the statement as a mere rhetorical device appear to have history on their
side, underscoring the skepticism about the realistic impact of sentiments
embracing stakeholderism.

68
Andrew Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, Harv. Bus.
Rev. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-the-business-roundtable-statement-just-empt
y-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/33EX-R45T].
69
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 106.
70
Id. at 95–96; Jesse Fried, The Roundtable’s Stakeholderism Rhetoric is Empty,
Thankfully, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Nov. 22, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harva
rd.edu/2019/11/22/the-roundtables-stakeholderism-rhetoric-is-empty-thankfully/ [https://per
ma.cc/CF28-AE3D].
71
See, e.g., Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at 399–400; Eldar, supra note 1, at 939–43;
Winston, supra note 68.
72
See Mayer, supra note 1, at 6–7, 12.
73
See Alex Edmans, Grow the Pie: How Great Companies Deliver Both Purpose and Profit
3–4 (2020) (noting that a corporate focus on social value increases the pie for everyone,
making the corporation more profitable).
74
See infra notes 81, 82; Rock, For Whom is the Corporation Managed?, supra note 13, at
393–95; Bhagat & Hubbard, supra note 13, at 11.
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2. The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality
Some question the sincerity of the embrace of stakeholderism based on
the activities of the Business Roundtable and many of the corporations
who have expressed a commitment to stakeholderism. In so doing, many
point to the historical activities of the Business Roundtable and the
statement’s signatories.75 One commentator has noted that the Business
Roundtable has fought against many efforts aimed at advancing the
interests of other stakeholders.76 Similar sentiments have been expressed
related to the corporations who signed the Business Roundtable
statement. As one commentator noted, “Scan the list of 181 signatories to
the recent memo and it’s a Who’s Who of corporate behavior that has
burdened and disadvantaged the very stakeholders they now will
champion.”77 Others point out that the Business Roundtable signatories
include companies that have spent years fighting against actions
beneficial to stakeholders or otherwise engaging in activities that have
proved harmful to other stakeholders.78 Still others have noted that many
corporations “have been preaching—though arguably not living” the
concept of social purpose for some time.79 As a result, some have insisted
that the historical activities of the corporations pose a “serious credibility
problem.”80
Commentators also have highlighted corporate actions and statements
that occurred after the statement’s release to support this credibility
problem. For example, Professor Dorothy Lund notes that Amazon
announced that it would cease paying medical and health benefits for

75

38.

See, e.g., Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1337–

76
See Barry Ritholtz, Stakeholder Capitalism Will Fail if It’s Just Talk, Bloomberg (Aug.
21, 2019), https://www.bloombergquint.com/gadfly/business-roundtable-shareholder-primac
y-shift-judged-by-actions [https://perma.cc/2B7Z-K8BT] (listing, among other things, efforts
to prevent consumer protection initiatives and fights against unions).
77
See id.; see also Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1,
at 1337–38 (discussing inconsistency between commitments and corporate conduct).
78
See Winston, supra note 68 (noting that the fact that Exxon Mobil “has spent decades
questioning climate change and slowing global action” makes it difficult to believe that the
company now cares for the stakeholders); Lund, supra note 17, at 1619–20 (pinpointing labor
and employment violations of companies who signed the Business Roundtable statement).
79
MacLellan, supra note 46 (noting that the Business Roundtable statement “will be
welcomed, but with skepticism”).
80
Minow, supra note 51; see also Winston, supra note 68 (noting that the history of some
corporations makes it “really hard to take some of these signatures seriously”).
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part-time workers mere days after signing the statement.81 In this same
vein, Professors Bebchuk and Tallarita’s survey of Business Roundtable
signatories revealed that such companies do not believe that the statement
committed them to materially change their behavior.82 Given the seeming
inconsistencies between companies’ historical behavior and the promises
associated with the statement, Bebchuk and Tallarita insist that this belief
confirms their view that the statement does not signal a shift towards more
socially responsible behavior.83
D. Reasons for Optimism
1. New Voices
While the embrace of stakeholderism is not new, those who have
embraced it are new. Indeed, it is clear that the concept of stakeholderism
has captured the attention of the business community, perhaps because
they are being embraced by members of the business community who
have heretofore been closely aligned with shareholder primacy.84 Thus,
when making its statement about stakeholderism, the Business
Roundtable explicitly noted that it had previously endorsed a corporate
purpose centered on shareholder primacy.85 In fact, in 2002, the Business
Roundtable issued the following statement:
Corporations are often said to have obligations to stockholders and to
other constituencies, including employees, the communities in which
they do business, and government, but these obligations are best viewed
as part of the paramount duty to optimize long-term stockholder value.86

In light of this statement, the Business Roundtable took great pains to
make clear that its 2019 statement reflected an explicit departure from its
prior conception of corporate purpose.87 One commentator noted that the
statement is “radically different” from its previous view that the
corporation owed its duty to stockholders and that other stakeholders were

81

Lund, supra note 17, at 1619–20.
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 131–32.
83
Id. at 137.
84
See Silk et al., supra note 29, at 15–16.
85
See Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 7.
86
See The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate Governance 30 (2002),
[https://perma.cc/REW7-33UX].
87
See Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 7.
82
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only of derivative importance.88 Another commentator referred to the
statement as a “sea change.”89 Hence, while stakeholderism is clearly not
new, the Business Roundtable endorsement of that rhetoric is new. The
Business Roundtable’s embrace of stakeholderism represents a
significant development in corporate governance.
The embrace by large and influential investor groups like Vanguard,
State Street, and BlackRock is also new. Indeed, traditional investors who
embraced stakeholderism were those who had a more obvious connection
to stakeholders, such as labor unions, pension funds, and faith-based
organizations.90 Thus, it is new that the top three asset managers in the
world have strenuously supported stakeholderism. It is also new that
equity and fixed-income investors—those who have historically been
“hands-off” when it comes to embracing a stakeholder ideal—have
actively begun to do so.91
It is new that hedge fund activists have begun to embrace
stakeholderism. Indeed, as one commentator noted, concepts associated
with social purpose and corporate social responsibility had been the
“bastion” of “do-gooders” but had not caught the attention of high-profile
activists.92 Certainly for these activists, this shift in focus on stakeholders
reflects a new paradigm.93
Perhaps most significantly, what is new is the growing consensus
among many corporate actors about the propriety of stakeholderism. As
one set of commentators notes, while the concepts of sustainability and
social purpose embedded in stakeholderism are by no means new, what is
new is the “move into the mainstream of the investment world.”94
Importantly, research suggests that this move into the mainstream will
continue to expand.95 The fact that the concepts reflected in
stakeholderism are increasingly being viewed as core components of
88

MacLellan, supra note 46.
Industry Week, supra note 31.
90
See Silk et al., supra note 29, at 9; see e.g., Kevin Bifulco, Faith-Based Investment and
Sustainability, Inspire (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.inspireinvesting.com/post/faith-basedinvestment-and-sustainability [https://perma.cc/G5D3-SNLR].
91
See Eccles & Klimenko, supra note 32.
92
Franck, supra note 33.
93
See id. (quoting hedge fund activists’ reference to the embrace of social and
environmental concerns as a “new paradigm for smart investing”); Eccles & Klimenko, supra
note 32.
94
Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The
Next Frontier in Environmental Information Regulation, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 625, 648 (2019).
95
See id. at 649–50.
89
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good corporate governance by a growing cross section of the corporate
community is new and bodes well for the possibility that those concepts
will actually impact corporate conduct.
2. New Weight
The recent stakeholderism embrace is also significant because it has
come from some of the most influential actors in the business community.
Fink’s statements are influential because BlackRock is influential.96
BlackRock is the world’s largest shareholder and asset manager.97
BlackRock holds a position in almost every major corporation in the
world, and it is the single biggest shareholder in many of those
companies.98 Indeed, BlackRock owns at least five percent of more than
half of all publicly traded companies.99 BlackRock therefore has a unique
seat at the corporate table coupled with a unique and unprecedented
ability to capture the attention of much of the business community and
influence the decisions made by members of that community.100 As a
result, the fact that BlackRock has put its weight behind supporting and
encouraging corporations to pay heed to their social purpose and
commitment to all stakeholders is especially notable and impactful.
Moreover, BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard are three of the
largest asset managers in the world. Hence, their collective voices reflect
significant influence in the corporate arena.
In addition, as the nation’s leading nonprofit association of chief
executives, Business Roundtable has long held a key position as the voice
of the nation’s largest corporations and their boards.101 One commentator
referred to Business Roundtable as “America’s most influential group of
corporate leaders.”102 Business Roundtable has been viewed as one
critical source of the collective sentiments of the country’s major public
officers and directors—those actors with the most influence over the
corporation and its operations.103 Illustrative of this influence, the
96
See Shawn McCoy, How BlackRock Wields Vast Influence over Government &
Economy, GV Wire (July 9, 2018), https://gvwire.com/2018/07/09/how-blackrock-wieldsvast-influence-over-government-and-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/8B5B-MKB7].
97
Id.; The Rise of BlackRock, supra note 3.
98
The Rise of BlackRock, supra note 3.
99
McCoy, supra note 96.
100
See id.; The Rise of BlackRock, supra note 3.
101
See MacLellan, supra note 46.
102
Id.
103
See id.
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signatories to the Business Roundtable statement led companies with an
aggregate market capitalization exceeding $11 trillion and reflect over
one-third of total market capitalization in the U.S. equity market.104
3. New Pressure
This most recent embrace is significant because it has emerged during
a period in corporate law when shareholders have greater power and have
demonstrated a willingness to use that power to pressure corporations
around issues related to social purpose.105 In the past few decades,
shareholder power has increased dramatically, leading to an environment
in which shareholders have increased influence over corporate affairs.106
Importantly, shareholders have been willing to use their increased
influence to pressure corporations to engage in more socially responsible
behaviors.107 Shareholder pressure has gotten results.108 These results
indicate that shareholders’ increased power may trigger an increased
opportunity for this most recent embrace of stakeholderism by
shareholders to result in real change. As one commentator has noted, the
one core reason why stakeholderism may be more than empty rhetoric
is that investors like BlackRock are putting pressure on companies to
rethink the role of business in society and to alter their actions consistent
with their new role.109
4. New Public Environment
Stakeholders’ increased power and visibility in influencing corporate
affairs also raises the likelihood that corporations comply with
commitments made to those stakeholders. The current information
environment ensures not only that stakeholders can more easily acquire
information about a corporation but also that such information is available

104

Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 106.
See Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and Future of
Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1301, 1322–
27 (2019) [hereinafter Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism].
106
See id. at 1327–28.
107
See, e.g., Franck, supra note 33; Fink, 2018 Letter, supra note 4.
108
See Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism, supra note 105, at 1327–29; Lisa M. Fairfax, Just
Say Yes? The Fiduciary Duty Implications of Directorial Acquiescence, 106 Iowa L. Rev.
1315, 1319–20 (2021) [hereinafter Fairfax, Just Say Yes?].
109
See Fairfax, Just Say Yes?, supra note 108, at 1319–20.
105
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to them on a continual basis.110 The Internet also enables stakeholders to
more easily communicate directly with one another, providing alternative
avenues for the sharing of corporate information such as online reviews,
blogs, and Instagram posts.111 This information environment dramatically
increases stakeholders’ ability to influence corporate behavior and
reputation.112 As Professor Hillary Sale notes, this new environment
means that corporations are no longer simply beholden to directors,
officers, and shareholders.113 Instead, outside stakeholders increasingly
have more influence over corporations, particularly public
corporations.114 Sale notes that the publicness of corporations means that
corporations are increasingly under pressure to align their behavior to
stakeholder expectations.115 In response, corporations expend significant
resources managing their reputations to appeal to stakeholders.116
Increasingly this includes a commitment to advancing stakeholder
interests. Empirical and anecdotal evidence reveals that stakeholders have
increasingly come to expect that corporations will manage their
businesses with an eye towards how their business activities impact social
issues ranging from environmental matters to race relations.117 Moreover,
110
See Keri Calagna, Managing Reputation Risk, Wall St. J. (July 24, 2017),
https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/07/24/managing-reputation-risk/ [https://perma.cc/YV7G56F4] (noting steep rise in stakeholder influence resulting from widespread availability of
corporate information as a result of 24/7 news coverage); Judy Larkin, Strategic Reputation
Risk Management 14 (2003) (noting that the Internet enables information to be shared about
corporations and their behaviors with broad audiences).
111
See Larkin, supra note 110, at 14, 17.
112
See id. at 14; Hillary A. Sale, The Corporate Purpose of Social License 6–7 (2019),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3189&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/XKC2-4GHM] (noting increased ability of public actors to influence private
company affairs).
113
Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & Contemp. Probs. 137, 138, 148
(2011) [hereinafter Sale, The New “Public” Corporation] (noting that corporations must
address the expectations of Main Street and must operate with a sense of their “publicness”);
Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1012, 1034 (2013) [hereinafter
Sale, Public Governance] (noting that the key to understanding corporation’s publicness is
understanding that groups outside of the corporation impact corporate governance and create
pressure for reform).
114
See Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 113, at 148; Sale, Public
Governance, supra note 113, at 1034–35.
115
See supra note 114.
116
See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory
Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 Yale J. on Regul. 499, 513 (2020).
117
See Larkin, supra note 110, at 18–19; Terry Nguyen, Consumers Don’t Care About
Corporate Solidarity. They Want Donations., Vox (June 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2020/6/3/21279292/blackouttuesday-brands-solidarity-donations [https://perma.cc/H7
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that evidence reveals that corporations respond to these expectations,
seeking to align both their rhetoric and behavior with increased
stakeholder expectations around socially responsible practices.118 The
publicness of corporations, and the stakeholder pressure that stems from
that publicness, increases the likelihood that corporations will align their
behavior to public expectations about social and antisocial activity.119
Corporations are willing to spend considerable sums seeking to manage
their reputations to appeal to stakeholders who increasingly expect
corporations to engage in socially responsible behaviors.120 This new
environment of stakeholder influence increases the potential that
corporate rhetoric related to stakeholders will be transformed into reality.
***
There are clearly reasons to be skeptical about the extent to which the
recent embrace of stakeholderism will have any significant impact on
corporate behavior. However, this Section offers some reasons for
optimism. As a result, this Article suggests that this new embrace of
stakeholderism may represent a new opportunity for advocates of that
norm to mobilize for real change. The next Part of this Article reveals that
the ability to take advantage of that opportunity and actualize
stakeholderism depends upon credible commitment.
II. CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS AND CORPORATE PURPOSE
The theory of credible commitment is an ideal lens through which to
analyze the viability of stakeholderism because that theory is aimed at
exploring the extent to which individuals will honor the promises they
make in an economic exchange. While credible commitment theory has
not been used to evaluate the viability of corporate purpose, others in the
corporate law and securities arena have relied upon credible commitment
theory to explain and understand the behaviors of corporate actors in

3J-4USR] (“People overwhelmingly prefer to buy from companies that share their beliefs and
values . . . .”); Omar Rodríguez-Vilá & Sundar Bharadwaj, Competing on Social Purpose,
Harv. Bus. Rev., https://hbr.org/2017/09/competing-on-social-purpose [https://perma.cc/KC
2X-RMNG] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022) (“Consumers increasingly expect brands to have not
just functional benefits but a social purpose. As a result, companies are taking social stands in
very visible ways.”).
118
See Larkin, supra note 110, at 3–4 (discussing the rising importance of corporate
reputation and stakeholder perceptions and the impact on corporate behavior).
119
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 510.
120
Id. at 513–16.
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various economic contexts.121 Thus, credible commitment theory can
provide valuable insights to the issue regarding whether we can expect
corporate actors to honor the commitments underlying their embrace of
stakeholderism.
In particular, credible commitment theory offers a typology of factors
for understanding why credible commitment to stakeholderism may prove
especially challenging. This typology centers around four factors: (1) the
uncertainty associated with the content of the commitment, (2) the longterm nature of the commitment, (3) the fact that the commitment seeks to
advance the interests of multiple parties, and (4) the lack of stakeholder
voice in the current accountability regime. After emphasizing the
importance of credible commitment, this Part will explore that typology
in relation to stakeholderism.
A. The Credible Commitment Imperative
First and most importantly, credible commitment theory demonstrates
the relatively intuitive fact that credible commitments are necessary to
ensure that actors adhere to the promises they make in an economic
exchange. The theory of credible commitment seeks to determine how
best to ensure that actors honor their promises in an economic
exchange.122 Such theory has its genesis in the economics literature.123
Nobel Prize winner Douglass North, the economist most closely

121

See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment
Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 675, 685 (2002) [hereinafter Rock,
Securities Regulation]; Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible
Commitment, 43 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 119, 120 (2015).
122
See Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. Institutional &
Theoretical Econ. 11, 11 (1993) [hereinafter North, Institutions and Credible Commitment]
(relying on game theory to analyze issues associated with credible commitment); Douglass C.
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 5–6 (1990) [hereinafter
North, Institutional Change] (discussing the importance of human behavior and individual
decisions that create our institutions and affect the costs of transacting); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 48–49 (1985) (noting that parties devise institutions
to generate compliance with bargains and pinpoint how best to create “credible
commitments”).
123
Nahalel A. Nellis, Note, Deficiencies in European Monetary Union’s Credible
Commitment Against Monetary Expansion, 33 Cornell Int’l L.J. 263, 271–72 (2000)
(crediting R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4 (1960), and North,
Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 4, for the birth of credible commitment theory).
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associated with credible commitment theory,124 and other economists
realized that the mere fact that actors make promises does not guarantee
that those promises will be kept. Instead, a credible commitment must be
made. “Credibility is a critical aspect of any commitment because ‘a
promise is not valuable unless its beneficiary believes that it will be
kept.’” 125 In other words, without credibility there is less assurance that
economic actors will comply with any commitments that they make.
The need for credible commitment is linked to discretion. At its core,
credible commitment theory focuses on identifying mechanisms for
restricting, conforming, or incentivizing the use of discretionary power in
order to render commitments more reliable.126 This is because when there
is considerable discretion, there is considerable need for assurances that
such discretion will be exercised in a manner that aligns with
commitments.127
North emphasizes that we cannot assume that economic actors will use
their discretion to comply with their commitments even if they are acting
in good faith.128 North admits that credible commitment is not the entire
solution to the problem of ensuring that economic actors keep their
promises, but it is “overwhelmingly the most pressing.”129
While credible commitment theory has not been used to evaluate the
viability of corporate purpose, corporate and securities law scholars have
recognized the critical importance of credible commitment in other
contexts.130 Professor Edward Rock has highlighted the need for credible
commitment in the securities law context and therefore relied on the
insights of credible commitment theory to evaluate strengths and
weaknesses related to credible commitments involving our disclosure
124
See also Nellis, supra note 123, at 272 (identifying North as the economist who applied
Coase’s theory to argue that reductions in transaction costs occur through institutions, which
constrain human behavior).
125
Charles Anthony Smith, Credible Commitments and the Early American Supreme Court,
42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 75, 79 (2008) (citing Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C.
Picker, Game Theory and the Law 51 (1994)).
126
Nellis, supra note 123, at 272 (noting that theory of credible commitment focuses
primarily on identifying sources of constraints that “ ‘disable or render costly’ the use of
discretionary power,” quoting Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem
of Government Commitment, in Social Theory for a Changing Society 245, 250 (Pierre
Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991)).
127
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 13.
128
See id. (noting that rational actors can act in a multitude of ways when confronted with
complicated choices, even when they have seemingly identical tastes).
129
Id. at 14.
130
See Rock, supra note 121, at 685–86; Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 120.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Stakeholderism & Credible Commitment

1189

regime.131 In fact, Rock contends that making commitments credible is
among the most important features of corporate law.132 Professors Ronald
Gilson and Alan Schwartz have addressed the need for credible
commitments for certain corporate governance arrangements, particularly
in the context of matters involving controlling shareholders.133 These
scholars have recognized the fact that credible commitments are
necessary to ensure that corporate officers and directors comply with their
obligations.
Importantly, current commentators also have implicitly recognized the
need for a credible commitment in the context of corporate purpose. For
example, Martin Lipton has complained about the lack of adequate
assurances or devices that can ensure that corporate officers and directors
will adhere to their responsibilities towards other stakeholders.134 This
complaint is in essence a concern about credible commitment. It is also
clear that the skepticism related to whether corporations will honor the
sentiments within the Business Roundtable statement stems from a lack
of belief in the credibility of their commitment—the lack of any means
for assuring us that such corporations will be compelled to make good on
their promises.135 This suggests that the dividing line between empty
rhetoric and meaningful change is credible commitment. At its core,
therefore, both the skeptics and those who profess some level of optimism
about the viability of stakeholderism have all recognized that a credible
commitment is necessary to ensure that corporations deliver on that norm.
B. A Typology of Credible Commitment Challenges
Credible commitment theory highlights a typology of factors that make
credible commitment especially challenging. First, the lack of clarity or
certainty related to the meaning or contours of a commitment undermines
the establishment of a credible commitment.136 Second, commitments
131

Rock, supra note 121, at 676–77.
See id. at 676 n.2.
133
Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 120.
134
Martin Lipton, Corporate Purpose: Stakeholders and Long-Term Growth, Harv. L. Sch.
F. on Corp. Governance (May 29, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/2
9/corporate-purpose-stakeholders-and-long-term-growth/ [https://perma.cc/68YU-LKFS].
135
See Minow, supra note 51; Ritholtz, supra note 76; Winston, supra note 68 (expressing
skepticism since some signatories had acted in direct opposition to Business Roundtable
initiatives); MacLellan, supra note 46.
136
See Nellis, supra note 123, at 287–89 (demonstrating how lack of clarity in the meaning
of credit institutions undermines credible commitment); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral
132
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involving decisions whose impacts can only be assessed in the long run
or that must be kept over a long period of time raise credibility
concerns.137 Third, commitments that involve promises to a range of
different interests or groups pose special credibility problems.138 Fourth,
when there exists no appropriate mechanism for holding economic actors
accountable for the commitment, it is harder to take the commitment
seriously.139
C. Credible Commitment Challenges to Stakeholderism
As an initial matter, credible commitment theory informs us that
credible commitment is particularly necessary in the corporate arena
because of the considerable discretion afforded to actors within that arena.
One of the core tenets of corporate law is that directors and officers have
broad discretion to manage the affairs of the corporation.140 This
discretion ensures that directors and officers can make decisions free from
second-guessing from other actors.141 However, credible commitment
theory makes clear that this broad discretion undermines the credibility of
corporate commitments.142 Credible commitment theory also reveals that
the typology of factors that pose credibility challenges applies with
special force in the context of stakeholderism.

Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs
Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 812 (2008) (discussing
credible commitment problems associated with the ambiguous standards and uncertain
definition of promises within Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”)); North, Institutional
Change, supra note 122, at 6 (noting the need to reduce uncertainty), 96–97 (describing how
the common law, an example of institution, reduces uncertainty through incremental
modification).
137
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 13, 15.
138
See Sebastian Krapohl, Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals and
Foodstuffs, 10 Eur. L.J. 518, 521–22 (2004) (demonstrating that a credible commitment
problem exists in making promises to diffuse interests of multiple groups); Nellis, supra note
123, at 274–75; North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 95 (indicating that it is
necessary to constrain human interaction when there are a large number of players in a game).
139
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitments, supra note 122, at 18 (discussing the
importance of accountability); Yackee, supra note 136, at 808.
140
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984); Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 439.
141
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 439–40.
142
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 13 (noting the
importance of disabling discretion for certain credible commitments); Nellis, supra note 123,
at 272 (noting the connection between discretion and credible commitment challenges).
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1. Identifying the Commitment
Credible commitment problems arise in two ways when there is a lack
of clarity regarding the nature of the commitment. First, the lack of clarity
related to the meaning or contours of a commitment undermines the
establishment of a credible commitment.143 Indeed, when commitments
are ambiguous or unclear, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint actions
promised and to determine if an actor’s conduct has complied with the
commitment, rendering the commitment potentially meaningless.144
Second, lack of clarity creates accountability concerns. It is extremely
difficult to hold a promisor accountable for failing to comply with a
commitment that is vague or ambiguous.145
Stakeholderism itself involves significant lack of clarity, underscored
by the difficulty in best describing stakeholderism. As an initial matter,
the multitude of labels by which stakeholderism has been referred
(ranging from stakeholder capitalism to Corporate Social Responsibility
(“CSR”), Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”), and
sustainability) underscores a certain lack of clarity related to the theory’s
meaning and contours.146 There is also a decided lack of clarity with
respect to the concerns and groups whose interests are to be pursued under
stakeholderism. Does it only include environmental and social issues?
Does it involve a commitment to charitable giving or altruistic behavior?
With respect to community concerns, does it include local, regional,
national, or global communities? Which stakeholders are included—just
employees, consumers, and customers? What about creditors and
suppliers? An assessment by Professors Bebchuk and Tallarita reveals
that state statutes expressly granting corporations the ability to advance
143

See Nellis, supra note 123, at 287 (demonstrating how lack of clarity in the meaning of
credit institutions undermines credible commitment), 290 (demonstrating how lack of clarity
related to the nature of the activities that comply with the commitment creates problems for
the credibility of that commitment); Yackee, supra note 136, at 808, 812.
144
See Yackee, supra note 136, at 808, 812.
145
See id. at 812.
146
Labels range between “sustainability,” “corporate social responsibility” (“CSR”),
“stakeholder capitalism,” “stakeholderism,” “stakeholder governance,” and environmental,
social, and governance (“ESG”). See, e.g., Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note
12, at 432 (articulating “corporate social responsibility”); Bratton, supra note 12, at 208–15
(analyzing different theories for defining legal corporate entities); Fort, supra note 12, at 184–
85 (discussing “stakeholder theory”); Hess, supra note 54, at 54–55 (touching on “stakeholder
theory,” “stakeholder management,” and “corporate social responsiveness”); see also Wells,
supra note 12, at 82–96 (explaining the history behind the modern legal debate regarding
corporate social responsibility).
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the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders (so-called other
constituency statutes) are not aligned on the question of which interests
should be advanced under the “stakeholder” label and thus differ on both
the groups and the interests identified.147 This lack of clarity not only
makes it difficult to pinpoint the precise nature of the commitment but
also makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not actors are complying
with their commitment when they engage in or forego particular actions
or decisions.148 In other words, this lack of clarity impedes the
establishment of credible commitment as well as the ability to hold actors
accountable for their commitment.
Perhaps most importantly, there is considerable lack of clarity with
respect to the content of stakeholderism itself. This issue has at least two
dimensions. First, there is a lack of clarity about the centrality of
shareholder concerns to stakeholderism.149 On one end of the spectrum
are those who insist that stakeholderism means that corporations should
pursue stakeholder interests, but only so long as those interests are
plausibly related to shareholder concerns.150 On the other end of the
spectrum are those who contend that stakeholderism stands for the
principle that corporations should be free to sacrifice shareholder
concerns in the pursuit of other stakeholder interests.151 Importantly,
many have opined that only the latter formulation of stakeholderism
merits our attention because the former aligns with corporations’ current
discretion and hence does not reflect a significant shift in corporate

147

See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 105, 117 (noting that all statutes list employees
and customers; some identify creditors, society, and local community, but others do not).
148
See id. at 115–16, 119–20.
149
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1323
(“Purpose advocates send mixed messages about the relationship of corporate purpose to
shareholder value.”).
150
See id. at 1329–30; Brandon Boze, Margarita Krivitski, David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan
& Eva Zlotnicka, The Business Case for ESG, Stanford Closer Look Series 1, 1 (May 23,
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393082 [https://perma.cc/STC3-C74A]; Bebchuk &
Tallarita, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing notion that consideration of stakeholders represents
a means to the end of shareholder welfare); Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a
Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1310 (noting that the corporate purpose debate is an effort to reorient
corporate decision-making away from profits and in favor of broader societal objectives).
151
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1332–33
(noting the position that the consideration of stakeholder interests is permissible even if
inconsistent with shareholder value); Lund, supra note 17, at 1626–27; Bebchuk & Tallarita,
supra note 1, at 114.
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purpose.152 This Article’s aim is not to resolve the question about the
precise meaning of stakeholderism, but instead to pinpoint the lack of
clarity associated with that meaning along with the insight that this lack
of clarity poses significant credible commitment challenges because it
once again underscores the difficulty of establishing and enforcing the
commitment.
The second clarity concern relating to the content of stakeholderism is
the lack of clarity surrounding the kinds of actions that advance the
various interests associated with stakeholderism.153 For example, the
Business Roundtable statement professes a commitment to “deliver[]
value to [their] customers.”154 What exactly does that mean? If you are an
airline company, does that mean that you must provide customers with
reasonably priced flights? Free snacks, meals, and other amenities? Have
more flight routes? Have more direct flight routes? Minimize wait times?
It is entirely possible that different customers may have different
understandings of what constitutes “value.” In fact, research suggests that
investors and other stakeholders pursue stakeholderism for a wide array
of reasons, which impact their understanding about the kinds of actions
that advance stakeholderism.155 Unless we have a better appreciation for
the actions that comply with stakeholderism, we may struggle to evaluate
the validity or veracity of a corporation’s commitment to that norm.
Importantly, the concern about lack of clarity as it relates to
stakeholderism is not novel. Indeed, historically one of the primary
criticisms of stakeholderism was lack of clarity.156 The lack of clarity with
respect to who is covered by stakeholderism, and what actions comply
with stakeholderism, raises serious concerns about whether we can fully

152
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1330–32;
Lund, supra note 17, at 1620, 1626; Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 110 (noting that the
conception that stakeholder concerns are linked to the long-term shareholder value is not
conceptually different from “old fashioned” shareholder primacy).
153
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1337
(noting lack of clarity around what commitments in corporate purpose documents mean).
154
Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 7; see also Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note
1, at 127 (referring to the statements in the Business Roundtable statement as “remarkably
vague” and offering “nonspecific and underdefined commitments”); Eldar, supra note 1, at
939 (referring to statements as vague).
155
See Esty & Karpilow, supra note 94, at 653 (noting difference between investors who
seek to “screen[] out bad actors” and those who look for a mix of sustainability and financial
performance).
156
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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articulate or identify compliance with stakeholderism.157 Credible
commitment theory confirms that this lack of clarity creates an obstacle
for meaningful commitment to stakeholderism.
2. The Trouble with Time
North has noted that a core credible commitment issue centers around
how to bind actors to agreements across time.158 Timing concerns have at
least two dimensions. The first concern centers around ensuring that there
is no change of heart and thus that there are assurances that present
commitments will be honored through the entire tenure of the promise.159
The second timing concern stems from the fact that some commitments
can only be realized after the passage of time.160 This makes it difficult to
determine if current actions comply with the commitment or otherwise
will influence future behavior in the appropriate manner.161 Of note,
timing concerns in the corporation may be magnified by the fact that
individuals responsible for complying with corporate commitments are
likely to change with the passage of time.
The credibility challenges associated with time apply with special force
in the context of stakeholderism. The hallmark of stakeholderism is that,
rather than focusing on short-term profit, the corporation should be run to
ensure the long-term health of the corporation.162 Proponents of
stakeholderism insist that in order to focus on the long term, corporations
must focus on the interests of the many non-shareholder stakeholders
whose efforts support the long-term health of the corporation.163 In this
regard, the focus on the long term is inextricably linked to stakeholderism

157

See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1337–38.
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 11, 13, 15 (noting
that time is critical and that credible commitment focuses on how best to bind players to an
agreement “across space and time”).
159
See id. at 14.
160
See id. at 15.
161
See North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 107 (noting concerns with time and
that credible commitments are intended to facilitate “the long-run performance of
economies”).
162
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 438; A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later,
16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, 52 (1991).
163
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 438 (noting that courts
allow directors to make decisions that further the corporation’s long-term interests); Sommer,
supra note 162, at 52.
158
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and its focus on advancing stakeholder interests.164 However, this focus
on the long term reflects both concerns that make timing an issue for
credible commitment. This long-term focus poses credible commitment
challenges because of the difficulty with ensuring that promises will be
kept over an extended period of time as well as the difficulty with
assessing whether current behaviors will have the desired long-term
result. The long-term aspect of stakeholderism therefore impedes the
ability to take the commitment seriously.165
3. Multiple Stakeholders and the Trade-off Dilemma
Commitments made to multiple groups pose credibility challenges on
two fronts. First, the commitment risks being illusory if it fails to
articulate how best to weigh competing interests and make appropriate
trade-offs. This is especially true when such groups have differing and
competing interests.166 Without articulating the rules associated with
these trade-offs, such commitments pose serious credibility challenges.
Second, commitments to multiple groups raise accountability concerns by
creating a potential to play groups off of one another.
Clearly stakeholderism envisions a commitment to multiple
stakeholders. Critics of stakeholderism argue that one of its primary flaws
is that it focuses on multiple stakeholders without any guidance around
how best to advance the interests of many different groups who may have
different and conflicting interests.167 To be sure, the rise in shareholder
power has revealed that the shareholder primacy norm also poses
challenges in this area because shareholders often have different and
divergent interests.168 Stakeholderism magnifies this problem. While
proponents of stakeholderism insist that this problem has been overstated
and can be overcome, even those proponents acknowledge that

164

See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 438; Sommer, supra note
162, at 52.
165
See Sommer, supra note 162, at 52 (explaining skeptics’ view by using an example of
when long-term stakeholderism conflicts with long-term shareholderism).
166
See Krapohl, supra note 138, at 521–22.
167
See Bainbridge, supra note 60, at 1435–42; Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 119–
21.
168
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan.
L. Rev. 1255, 1283 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 561, 564 (2006); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors,
30 J. Corp. L. 219, 229–42 (2005).
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stakeholderism may be more challenging because it requires directors to
weigh a broader range of competing interests.169
This trade-off concern is multidimensional. For example, trade-offs
often must be made between individuals within a stakeholder group.170
Employees are not monolithic. If corporations have the goal of advancing
workforce diversity, are there trade-offs to be made associated with
focusing on one form of diversity rather than another? There are also, of
course, trade-offs between different stakeholder groups.171 Consider the
interests of airline customers who want more flight routes and the interests
of airline employees for whom additional flight routes may mean less
downtime. This is magnified by the trade-offs between shareholders and
non-shareholder stakeholders. That is, between airline customers who
want cheaper flights with more free amenities and shareholders who may
want to maximize profits by raising ticket prices and charging fees for
even basic amenities. These examples reveal that a commitment to all
stakeholders could be rendered meaningless unless there is some
guidance regarding how corporations should make trade-offs.172
The second concern with commitments made to multiple groups is that
such commitments raise accountability problems. Such commitments
may be difficult to enforce because of the difficulty of pinpointing
whether an individual’s actions reflect noncompliance or simply a
furtherance of the interests of one of many groups. This creates a credible
commitment problem because the actor making the commitment can play
different groups off of one another and opportunistically breach
commitments with different groups by externalizing the costs on one
169

See Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1409, 1418 (1993).
170
See, e.g., Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1333–
35; Robert H. Mundheim, What is the Significance of the Business Roundtable Statement on
the Purpose of a Corporation? Salzburg Glob. Seminar (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.salzburgg
lobal.org/news/impact/article/robert-h-mundheim-what-is-the-significance-of-the-businessroundtable-statement-on-the-purpose-of-a-corporation [https://perma.cc/9X6Z-XVQR].
171
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1333–35.
172
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 119–21 (noting that how best to resolve tradeoffs is a challenging question that must be resolved by advocates of stakeholderism). Bebchuk
and Tallarita note that some deemphasize the trade-off problems, suggesting that there are
“win-win” situations. See id. at 129. This Article agrees that such a suggestion is unrealistic.
These concerns have been raised in the context of constituency statutes and public benefit
corporations that enable corporations to consider a range of stakeholder interests. See Thorelli,
supra note 50, at 1764–65; Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 765, 794 (2009).
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group while receiving benefits from another.173 Commentators have
dubbed this the “two masters” problem: “[A] manager told to serve two
masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been
freed of both and is answerable to neither.”174 Importantly, accountability
problems arise even if actors are not playing one group off of another
because corporations can simultaneously engage in “good” and “bad”
actions.175 As the late Professor Lynn Stout noted, there is a “yin and
yang” that often animates corporate conduct and frustrates those seeking
to ensure that corporations engage in conduct that advances the interests
of multiple stakeholders.176 Stout observed that this yin and yang means
that “[i]n the process of producing desirable things, corporations can
produce less desirable things as well.”177 This yin and yang also may
negate the ability to assess corporate compliance, or otherwise may make
it difficult to hold corporations responsible for noncompliance. At the
very least, the variety of commitments embedded in stakeholderism poses
credibility challenges associated with how best to hold corporations
accountable to those commitments.
Some have suggested that the connection between trade-off concerns
and credible commitment challenges has been vastly overstated for
several reasons.178 First, the concern ignores the reality that
businesspeople must make trade-offs all the time.179 Second, and in so
doing, the concern fails to give sufficient weight to the expertise of
businesspeople who have developed the capacity to make such trade-offs.
Advocates of stakeholderism insist that businesspeople routinely make
trade-offs and that businesspeople routinely make trade-offs involving

173

See Nellis, supra note 123, at 275.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
38 (1991); see Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 432–33; Bainbridge,
supra note 60, at 1435–42.
175
See Lynn Stout, Sergio Gramitto & Tamara Belinfanti, Citizen Capitalism: How a
Universal Fund Can Provide Influence and Income to All 18–19 (2019).
176
See id.
177
See id. at 18.
178
See Colin Mayer, Shareholderism versus Stakeholderism – A Misconceived
Contradiction. A Comment on “The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance” by Lucian
Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita 1–2 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Paper No. 522/2020,
2020).
179
See id. Blair and Stout indicate that there should be no rule to resolve trade-offs. Instead,
they insist that directors should be trusted to resolve trade-offs. See Blair & Stout, supra note
12, at 327. This Article contends that this resolution raises accountability and thus credibility
concerns.
174
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stakeholders.180 Third, the trade-off concern proves too much. Trade-offs
are an inevitable by-product of business decisions, and it would be
difficult to imagine a rule that could delineate precise guidance for every
trade-off decision.181 If the trade-off dilemma prevents credible
commitment, it suggests that no commitment can be credible. In this
regard, the emphasis on trade-offs appears to prove too much, completely
eviscerating the possibility of any credible commitment in the corporate
sphere.
These observations miss the point. Emphasizing the importance of
trade-offs to credible commitment does not ignore the reality of business
decisions. Indeed, this Article does not disagree that businesspeople
routinely make trade-offs. Nor does this Article disagree that many
businesspeople have the capacity and expertise to make those trade-offs.
However, this Article does insist that unless there are some guiding
principles regarding how those trade-offs should be made, we have less
assurances that businesspeople are considering the right inputs when
making those trade-offs. That is, we have less assurances that those tradeoffs are consistent with corporate commitments to other stakeholders.
Moreover, without guiding principles, we have no significant yardstick
by which to measure the propriety of those trade-offs. The issue is not
whether or not businesspeople have the capacity to make trade-offs.
Instead, the issue is whether we have sufficient assurances that corporate
actors will make those trade-offs with the appropriate considerations.182
The fact is that trade-offs are challenging in any corporate setting.
Stakeholderism exacerbates these challenges. The concerns raised in
Part I about the misalignment between corporations’ activities and their
stated commitment to stakeholderism suggest that corporations have not
been making the appropriate trade-offs, thereby suggesting at the very
least that corporations need better guidance in this area. Importantly, to
the extent directors’ current trade-offs are guided by shareholder primacy,
it is arguable that their current trade-offs are guided by financial
180

See Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 325–27.
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 430–33; see also Lawrence
E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 589 (1992) (describing the complexity of navigating trade-offs
when balancing different stakeholder interests); Green, supra note 169, at 1418–19
(questioning emphasis on directors’ inability to make trade-offs).
182
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 509–10 (noting that a core difficulty with social purpose
norm is determining whether economic actors are making appropriate trade-offs with respect
to securities disclosures).
181
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considerations. From this perspective, directors’ historical expertise may
not be aligned with the needed experience with making trade-offs in the
context of a normative environment that does not prioritize shareholders.
Moreover, the lack of clarity surrounding the precise nature of
stakeholderism means that it is not entirely clear what considerations
should be guiding trade-off concerns. Collectively, these observations
reveal that the fact that directors routinely make important trade-offs does
not negate the difficulties associated with making those trade-offs.
Instead, credible commitment theory makes clear that the promise to
deliver value to multiple stakeholders, without any guidance about the
factors to be considered when making those trade-offs, poses unique
challenges that may render commitments to stakeholderism significantly
less credible.
4. The Accountability Puzzle
Credible commitment challenges emerge when there is no guarantee
that accountability vehicles can be aligned with commitments.
Accountability is an important aspect of credible commitment.183
Commitment is made credible when the promisee has some assurances
that the promisor will be held accountable for complying with the
commitment.184
Commitments to stakeholderism raise thorny accountability concerns.
Corporate law vests accountability primarily in directors and
shareholders. The fact that accountability rests with these two groups
necessarily raises credible commitment concerns stemming from the
potential that the incentives of these groups may not be aligned with
stakeholder commitments.185 Given the range of legal and extralegal
factors aimed at focusing director attention on shareholders, directors’
incentives are not necessarily aligned with other stakeholders. Moreover,
while shareholders have certainly been on the forefront of pressuring
corporations to advance socially responsible commitments, many have
183

See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 18; Yackee, supra
note 136, at 808.
184
See supra note 183.
185
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1335
(noting concern that current environment does not modify the fact that shareholders ultimately
control corporate decision through their voting power and capital market discipline); Julian
Velasco, Shareholder Primacy in Benefit Corporations, in Fiduciary Obligations in Business
318, 320–22 (Arthur B. Laby & Jacob Hale Russell eds., 2020) (noting concerns about reliance
on shareholders in the context of benefit corporations).
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questioned the veracity of their efforts and the extent to which we can be
assured that their efforts will persist.186 Irrespective of whether directors
or shareholders make good representatives for stakeholder concerns, the
reality is that stakeholders essentially have no formal accountability role
in the current governance structure. Instead, stakeholders must depend
upon directors or shareholders to represent their interests. This
dependence raises credible commitment concerns.
D. Credible Commitment Solutions
North and other credible commitment theorists agree that in order to
overcome or minimize hurdles to credible commitment, mechanisms
must be devised that constrain or guide discretion to align with particular
commitments and promote commitment compliance.187 North refers to
such mechanisms as institutions.188 North has theorized that institutions
overcome credible commitment challenges when they provide two critical
elements: (1) a set of understandable rules, and (2) a system to impartially
enforce those rules.189 In his article on credible commitments in the
securities law context, Professor Rock confirms the need for rules and a
reliable and objective enforcement mechanism in the corporate arena.190
Similarly, in their recent scholarship on the impact of corporate purpose,
Professors Fisch and Solomon argue that in order for corporate purpose
to achieve its instrumental value, statements related to corporate purpose
must be concrete enough to ascertain their meaning, and they must be
enforceable.191
186
See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s):
Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1243, 1246–48, 1263–64, 1275 (2020).
187
Addressing credible commitment challenges is linked to reducing transaction costs. See
North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 18. North built on Ronald
Coase’s theory that low transaction costs facilitate economic bargains, arguing that reduced
transaction costs constrain behavior. See id. at 11 (explaining and expanding on Coase’s
work); North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 4; Nellis, supra note 123, at 272.
188
See North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 3–4, 97. According to North, if
institutions do not provide constraints, there is nothing to bind actors to the promises they
make. See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 11–13.
189
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 18, 21 (asserting
that credible commitments require a method to both measure and enforce the agreement or
commitment); Yackee, supra note 136, at 808 (indicating that “effective institutional solutions
to the credible commitment problem” focus on the creation of formal rules and systems to
enforce those rules).
190
See Rock, supra note 121, at 685–86.
191
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1344.
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Collectively, rules and impartial enforcement overcome the
commitment challenges identified in Part C. Rules give voice to the
content of the commitment, providing the principles around which to
organize behavior.192 A lack of clearly identifiable rules exacerbates
uncertainty and ambiguity, making it difficult to interpret the commitment
and thus difficult to ensure adherence to the commitment.193 By contrast,
clear and identifiable rules help alleviate the uncertainty and ambiguity
that make credible commitment challenging. When commitments involve
multiple groups or interests, rules must incorporate a set of guiding
principles regarding how best to make critical trade-offs among diffuse
interests. In these ways, rules constrain behavior, thereby reducing the
transaction costs associated with complying with commitments. That is,
rules facilitate credible commitment.
To be clear, this Article does not use the term “rules” to suggest that
we must generate clear-cut rules for every commitment in order to reduce
uncertainty and better ensure the credibility of the commitment. The wellworn literature regarding the propriety of rules versus standards reveals
that while clear-cut rules may offer more predictability, particularly with
respect to enforcement, clear-cut rules can be both under- and overinclusive, inflexible, difficult to update, and more susceptible to
manipulation.194 This Article does not seek to resolve the rules-versusstandards debate. However, insights from that debate only underscore the
importance of at least some degree of certainty for ensuring commitment
credibility. Indeed, that debate makes clear that vague or ambiguous
standards increase discretion and thus may reduce the credibility of a
commitment by reducing the clarity needed to ensure rule compliance and
predictable enforcement.195 More importantly, the debate regarding rules
192
See Rock, supra note 121, at 686–87 (finding credible commitment necessitates
specifying rules or guiding principles animating the commitment); Krapohl, supra note 138,
at 525–26.
193
See Yackee, supra note 136, at 812 (noting the credible commitment challenges
associated with ambiguous promises of uncertain meaning).
194
See Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 Hofstra L. Rev. 53, 58 (2012); Samuel W.
Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 611, 612–13 (2011) (noting rules have
a greater susceptibility to manipulation); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 559, 588–89 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Playing with
the Rules, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1560, 1560–61 (1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 268 (1974) (noting over- and
under-inclusiveness of rules).
195
See Julian J.Z. Polaris, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balancing Specificity and
Ambiguity in Financial Regulation, 33 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 231, 248 (2014); James J. Park,
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versus standards reveals the importance of having at least some standard
aimed at defining behaviors reflected in particular commitments. This is
because even supporters of standards agree that there must be some
content around the standard in order to provide sufficient clarity for
purposes of compliance and enforcement.196 In other words, standards
also reduce uncertainty because standards contain some content. Indeed,
the debate regarding rules versus standards reveals that the difference
between rules and standards is a matter of degree.197 Moreover, that
debate suggests that optimal regulation (and, by extension, optimal
credibility) likely requires some combination of precise rules and more
broad standards.198 From this perspective, while credible commitment
theory does not require clear-cut rules associated with all commitments,
that theory, informed by this debate, does suggest that we at least need
standards that involve some specific directives associated with those
commitments, along with more specific rules in some contexts, in order
to ensure commitment credibility.199 In this regard, this Article uses the
term “rules” broadly to incorporate some set of guiding principles by
which we can pinpoint the content of the commitment at issue.
Along these same lines, some have argued that vagueness and
uncertainty are not inconsistent with constraints on behavior.200 Certain
Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 115,
119 (2012); Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance
Jurisprudence, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1461, 1466; Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
Calif. L. Rev. 953, 1021–22 (1995); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101, 113 (1997).
196
See Bayern, supra note 194, at 58–59; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 379, 383 & n.18, 410–11 (1985); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65, 75–76 (1983); Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal
Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 B.U.
Pub. Int. L.J. 175, 190–91 (2010).
197
See Bayern, supra note 194, at 59; Kaplow, supra note 194, at 560; Posner, supra note
195, at 113; Schlag, supra note 196, at 383–84; Diver, supra note 196, at 76; Ehrlich & Posner,
supra note 194, at 258.
198
See Polaris, supra note 195, at 242.
199
See id.; Schlag, supra note 196, at 383 n.18; Diver, supra note 196, at 71.
200
See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in Philosophical
Foundations of Language in the Law 58, 62–63 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011)
[hereinafter Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance]; Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and
Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 509, 510, 535 (1994) [hereinafter
Waldron, Vagueness in Law] (noting that vagueness is not necessarily inconsistent with
commitments and that the need to eliminate vagueness has been exaggerated). Scholars
suggest that it may be impossible to eliminate vagueness. See id. at 510–11, 522–26 (noting
that even precise rules do not constrain behavior because individuals must interpret and apply
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levels of vagueness allow for adaptability and flexibility.201 Certain levels
of vagueness may also guard against overly narrow interpretations of
specific rules.202 However, even those who insist that there are virtues to
vagueness admit that vagueness raises concerns related to the use of
discretion.203 Moreover, those scholars acknowledge that vagueness may
be beneficial in some circumstances but not in others.204 Then, too,
advocates of vagueness do admit that some guidance or direction is
necessary so that actors may have an appreciation of how best to exercise
their discretion.205 Perhaps more importantly, such advocates argue that
internalized norms overcome vagueness concerns because, once a norm
is internalized, it offers guidance around how best to modify behavior and
curtail discretion.206 From this perspective, advocates of vagueness do not
contend that vagueness does not present commitment challenges, but
rather they argue that other factors (i.e., norms) serve to ameliorate those
challenges.207
Enforcement similarly constrains behavior and thus reduces hurdles to
credible commitment. Vigorous and consistent enforcement operates to
increase the transaction costs associated with noncompliance and thus
helps deter nonadherence to the commitment.208 By contrast, weak or
nonexistent enforcement undermines the ability to establish a credible
commitment by undermining the ability to provide specific and general
deterrence.209 Enforcement is especially important for commitments that
must be kept over a long period of time because such enforcement guards
against the potential that actors will change their minds or behaviors.210

the rules). Scholars in this area note the similarities to their concerns related to vagueness and
the rules-versus-standards debate. See Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra, at 65.
201
See Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra note 200, at 65.
202
See id. at 70–71.
203
See id. at 72–73.
204
See id. at 70–71.
205
See id. at 66–67; see Waldron, Vagueness in Law, supra note 200, at 537 (noting that
vagueness does not mean the same as lack of guidance).
206
See Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra note 200, at 65 (noting that when an
actor internalizes a norm, the norm serves as a source of guidance that ensures he makes,
monitors, and modifies his behavior consistent with the norm and that norms provide the input
that helps direct discretion towards particular behavior).
207
See id.
208
See Nellis, supra note 123, at 281; Rock, supra note 121, at 685–86, 697.
209
See Rock, supra note 121, at 685.
210
See id. at 697 (finding long-term commitments in securities regulation not credible
without corresponding commitment to identify and enforce breaches).
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Others implicitly have focused on the importance of rules and
enforcement in the recent embrace of stakeholderism. On the one hand,
commentators have pointed out that whether corporations actually focus
on stakeholderism will depend on how “specifically and quantifiably”
goals are defined.211 On the other hand, those commentators have
emphasized the need for articulating the specific mechanisms
corporations will use to enforce those goals.212 These observations align
with prevailing theory regarding how best to overcome credible
commitment challenges.
***
Credible commitment theory raises significant concerns about the
extent to which stakeholderism can be realized. This is because, first and
foremost, the credible commitment theory highlights the fact that without
mechanisms in place to ensure that corporate directors will be compelled
to focus on all stakeholders, there is no guarantee that stakeholderism will
be realized. Second and equally as important, credible commitment
theory reveals that there are significant challenges to credible
commitments in the corporate space generally and specifically with
stakeholderism. These challenges stem from the long-term nature of the
commitment, the uncertainty associated with the content of the
commitment, the fact that the commitment is being made to advance the
interests of multiple parties, and the lack of stakeholder voice in the
current accountability regime. The next Part of this Article assesses
whether we can plausibly overcome these challenges.
III. HICCUPS WITH EXISTING CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS VEHICLES
There is a wide array of vehicles corporations can utilize as plausible
sources of credible commitment.213 Potential credible commitment
vehicles range from third-party certification, emphasizing shareholder
proposals and bylaw changes, tethering stakeholder goals to executive
compensation, altering corporate charters, creating new legal entities, and
reliance on sustainability indices—to name a few. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to assess all of these vehicles. However, this Article will
examine three of the most prevalent and oft-cited reforms. The
211
See Minow, supra note 51 (expressing a need to have stakeholder goals tied to
compensation).
212
See id.
213
See Silk et al., supra note 29, at 13 (noting key trends in addressing ESG issues).
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examination reveals that they each individually may fall short when
measured against the typology of factors needed to be overcome in order
to facilitate credible commitment.
A. Inherent Limits of Fiduciary Duty
This Article began with an analysis of fiduciary law for several reasons.
Scholars have argued that fiduciary duty law represents one of the most
promising vehicles for facilitating credible commitment.214 On the one
hand, rigorous judicial review of that law serves as a crucial standardsetting mechanism providing guidance and clarity about the rules of
engagement related to particular conduct.215 Such review also helps to
ensure that commitments are kept over the long term. On the other hand,
courts serve as objective accountability vehicles through their
enforcement of fiduciary duty breaches.216 Because effective judicial
review and enforcement enables parties to credibly commit to the
promises captured by fiduciary duty law, that law is a viable source of
credible commitment and hence worthy of exploration.217 Finally, the fact
that fiduciary law governs all corporations, both public and private, makes
it especially appealing as a credible commitment vehicle.218
Recently, several prominent scholars have indicated that fiduciary law,
appropriately reformed, is one of the most viable mechanisms for
facilitating credible commitment to stakeholderism.219 Scholars and
legislators have argued that fiduciary duty law can be reformed in at least
two respects: (1) by making the fiduciary obligation to other stakeholders
mandatory,220 thereby enhancing the rules or guidelines associated with
stakeholderism, and (2) by broadening the class of people who can bring
fiduciary suits to include non-shareholder stakeholders, and thus

214

See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 120 (noting that many jurisdictions address
the credible commitment problem through fiduciary law).
215
See id. at 120–21.
216
See id. at 120 (noting that courts will void transactions that do not comport with fiduciary
duty laws).
217
See id. at 120–21; Yackee, supra note 136, at 808 (noting the necessity of an effective
judiciary for credible commitments); North, Institutions and Credible Commitments, supra
note 122, at 21 (noting that enforcing institutional constraints is essential to the establishment
of a polity).
218
See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 120–21, 120 n.9.
219
See Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at 403–04.
220
See id. at 430–31; Hess, supra note 54, at 66–67 (arguing that reporting about social
impacts should be mandatory); Sommer, supra note 162, at 44.
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increasing the potential for enforcement to align with stakeholder
concerns.221 This Article raises concerns regarding whether either of these
changes are likely to overcome the flaws associated with fiduciary duty
law as a credible commitment device for stakeholderism.
1. The Illusory Promise of Fiduciary Mandates
Throughout history, many proponents of stakeholderism have
advocated mandating an obligation to stakeholders.222 In their view, such
a mandate would serve to ensure that directors pay heed to stakeholder
concerns.223
However, seeking to mandate a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders is
unlikely to enhance its credible commitment potential because (1) it is
unlikely to constrain discretion in a manner that produces clear rules and
guidelines, and (2) it fails to respond to trade-off concerns.
First, it is not entirely clear that a mandate would be significantly
different than the current fiduciary environment. Of course there is a body
of case law suggesting that corporate directors cannot pay heed to the
interests of other stakeholders because they owe their fiduciary duty to
shareholders and maximizing their profit.224 However, the vast majority
of corporate law scholars have come to appreciate that fiduciary duty law
grants boards wide discretion to advance the interests of nonshareholders.225 This is because courts assess breaches of fiduciary duty
221
See Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at 428 (discussing Senator Warren’s model of
public benefit corporations); Hess, supra note 54, at 72.
222
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 411–12 & n.10 (explaining
scholars who call for mandating corporate commitment to advancing interests of
stakeholders).
223
See id.
224
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
225
Lipton, supra note 116, at 504–05; see also Pollman, History and Revival, supra note 1,
at 1443–47 (providing examples of corporations who have missions aligned with their
corporate brand that seek to advance interests of the public, such as Ben & Jerry’s); Lund,
supra note 17, at 1620–21 (asserting that CSR bonds could induce corporations “to take profitsacrificing actions that have large welfare benefits”); Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations
Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1323 (noting that “the proposition that existing law prohibits
corporate decision makers from considering and incorporating the interests of stakeholders
and society” is overstated); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 94 (suggesting that
“external” interventions, including labor and consumer protection laws, will incentivize
companies to behave in ways that benefit stakeholders); Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at
424–25 (noting judicial authority supporting board discretion in this area); Robert B.
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against the business judgment rule, which grants directors broad
discretion. Consistent with this discretion, except in limited
circumstances,226 courts already grant corporations the flexibility to
advance and even favor the interests of non-shareholders.227 Moreover, if
corporate officers and directors have the obligation to operate in the best
interests of the corporation, and there is growing consensus that such
operation must include focusing on other stakeholders, then theoretically
this obligation (and the corresponding mandate) already exists.228 And in
fact, there are some courts willing to recognize this obligation.229 From
this perspective, this begs the question of what more work a mandate
would do.
Second, it is not clear if a mandate would limit discretion to provide
the hoped-for rule clarity needed to facilitate credible commitment. It
seems likely that mandating a focus on other stakeholders will expand,
rather than constrain, the discretion afforded to boards under the business
judgement rule. In other context, legislatures have been quick to point out
that mandates associated with advancing stakeholder interests would be
impractical and unworkable because courts would not be equipped to
provide clear rules with respect to such a mandate.230 Judges routinely
Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 Bus. Law. 381, 390
(2016) (noting survey revealing that most directors felt accountable to multiple stakeholders);
Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1436 (2006) (“[M]anagers who carefully attend to the firm’s profits also
must seek at least to some extent to further society’s interests.”).
226
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 458–59 (pinpointing
takeover and sale of control settings in which fiduciary duty demands focus on shareholder
value); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Revlon, 506
A.2d at 182.
227
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 439–40; see also Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that business judgment rule acknowledges
managerial prerogatives and ensures that directors’ judgment will be respected by the courts
absent abuse of discretion); Martin Lipton, supra note 134 (noting that courts have used the
business judgment rule to sanction the ability of boards to advance the interests of their various
stakeholders, and thus “[t]here is no legal impediment” to boards following the path of
“balancing the interests of all stakeholders”).
228
See Ribstein, supra note 224, at 1442; see also Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809
(Del. 2019) (noting that a corporation has an obligation to focus on consumer health and
safety, given that its only product line (ice cream) was solely dependent on consumer
confidence in health and safety of the product).
229
See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809 (holding that directors’ fiduciary duties require
monitoring risks related to consumer health and safety because they are critical to their
mission).
230
See Sommer, supra note 162, at 45 (explaining legislature’s clarification in the context
of interpreting constituency statutes).
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express concern with second-guessing director decisions and extreme
reluctance with being asked to more precisely define the contours of those
decisions.231 One can only imagine that these concerns and reluctance will
be exacerbated in the context of a mandated focus on stakeholders. It
seems plausible that courts may grant directors more—rather than less—
discretion in recognition of the difficulties associated with seeking to
meet the needs of a vast array of constituents.232 From this perspective, it
seems relatively unlikely that a mandate would solve credible
commitment challenges associated with fiduciary duty law because it is
unlikely that courts will significantly alter the broad discretion they grant
director decisions in this area.233
Third, such a mandate does not respond to the trade-off concern. This
trade-off concern relates not only to trade-offs between shareholders and
non-shareholder stakeholders but also among stakeholder groups.234
Others have raised significant concerns about the ability of fiduciary law
to promote stakeholderism precisely because it fails to pinpoint how best
to make trade-offs among various groups.235 Mandating a focus on
stakeholders does not ameliorate these concerns. Indeed, similar to the
reluctance to give guidance around business decisions more generally,
judges have expressed concern about disturbing decisions that involve
difficult trade-offs.236 This reluctance suggests that corporations may
have more, rather than less, discretion with such a reform, thereby
undermining credible commitment.
At the very least, these observations suggest that fiduciary law itself
will not produce guidelines with respect to appropriate trade-offs. As a
result, even if the law expands directors’ discretion to make trade-offs, it
231

See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 437–39.
See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False
Fears, 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 85, 108 (noting judicial reluctance to impose duties on directors
or to find directors liable when there are no clear rules about how to make trade-offs).
233
See Sommer, supra note 162, at 44 (pinpointing problems with the effort to mandate
directors’ duties to other stakeholders).
234
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1321
(noting that scholars have pointed out that shareholders may have heterogenous interests);
Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 168, at 1283 (noting conflicting goals among shareholders).
235
See Lipton, supra note 134 (noting that principles governing director behavior fall short
of providing real assurances concerning commitments to social purpose when they do not
address how to weigh competing objectives); Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a
Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1333–35 (same); Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 119–21;
Sommer, supra note 162, at 55.
236
See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Fairfax, Doing Well
While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 437–39.
232
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seems unlikely that the law will help to meaningfully shape or guide those
trade-off decisions, undermining the extent to which the law itself can
overcome credible commitment challenges posed by these trade-off
issues.
2. Authority Without Accountability
To be sure, granting groups other than shareholders the authority to
bring fiduciary duty claims does at least ensure that stakeholders are not
wholly dependent upon shareholders for conforming corporate behavior
to stakeholderism. Other than creditors in very limited circumstances,237
shareholders are currently the only group that has standing to bring suit
for breach of fiduciary duty.238 This fact poses a challenge for
enforcement of the commitment.239 It means that shareholders not only
must support board actions that advance stakeholder concerns but also
that shareholders must be willing to hold boards accountable for their
failure to advance such concerns.240 To be sure, shareholders have been
taking a leading role in both supporting and encouraging director action
aimed at advancing stakeholder concerns. This suggests that stakeholders
can depend upon shareholders. Consistent with this suggestion, there are
very few lawsuits seeking to challenge boards’ decisions to focus on other
stakeholders or social issues.241 However, it is not clear to what extent
stakeholders can depend upon shareholders to hold directors accountable
when they ignore stakeholder concerns. Indeed, until very recently, there
were no reported cases of shareholders using fiduciary law to bring
237
See Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 1053, 1054–55 (2008)
(explaining creditor rights in the “zone of insolvency”); Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1384
(2007); Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 1189, 1190 (2003); Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1 (Del.
Ch. 1991).
238
See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1.
239
See Fisch & Solomon, “Value” of a Public Benefit Corporation, supra note 50, at 75
(noting that, in the context of public benefit corporations, accountability concerns arise when
enforcement of fiduciary rights rest solely with shareholders).
240
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 506; Lipton, supra note 134 (noting that shareholders must
consistently support board decisions to manage the interests of stakeholders).
241
See Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good, supra note 12, at 440. But see Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (challenging decision
to focus on creditors rather than shareholders); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,
16 A.3d 1, 11 (Del. Ch. 2010) (challenging decision to further social purpose goals rather than
profit-making concerns).
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actions against directors for ignoring the interests of other stakeholders.242
Thus, as of 2015, Gilson and Schwartz’s survey of fiduciary law failed to
unearth any such cases.243 Perhaps more importantly, it is not clear that
stakeholders can depend upon shareholders to hold directors accountable
for actions that fail to appropriately prioritize stakeholder concerns when
they conflict with shareholder interests, especially shareholders’ shortterm profit interests.244 At the very least, therefore, changing the standing
rules gives stakeholders a seat at the table in terms of fiduciary duty
breaches. Thus, setting aside the logistical hurdles associated with
granting a wide variety of stakeholder groups the ability to bring fiduciary
duty claims, altering the standing rules does ensure that these groups are
not wholly dependent on shareholders to vindicate their interests. Hence,
such a grant appears to enhance the ability of fiduciary law to serve as an
accountability check for stakeholderism.
However, changing the standing rules may not be sufficient to salvage
the enforcement deficits associated with fiduciary duty law and thus may
be of limited utility for credible commitment purposes. Indeed, Gilson
and Schwartz suggest that the fact that courts impose the laxest standard
of review when assessing claims under the business judgment rule renders
fiduciary duty law incapable of performing its credible commitment
function.245 This review standard is compounded by procedural hurdles,
indemnification provisions, and exculpatory statutes, all of which make it
nearly impossible to bring claims against directors or to hold directors
personally liable for breaching their duties.246 If we assume that the same
242
See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 124–25 (discussing dearth of cases); Springer,
supra note 232, at 108–09 (same). But see Kevin LaCroix, The Gap Hit with Board Diversity
Derivative Lawsuit, The D&O Diary (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2
020/09/articles/director-and-officer-liability/the-gap-hit-with-board-diversity-derivative-laws
uit/ [https://perma.cc/3JM9-N56P] (discussing Oracle, Facebook, The Gap, and other
shareholder lawsuits challenging corporate decision-making related to diversity).
243
See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 124–25 (discussing low likelihood of
shareholders litigating these cases).
244
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 505–06 (suggesting that dependence on shareholders for
accountability is problematic because stakeholders’ long-term interests may be sacrificed for
near-term financial gains).
245
See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 120–21.
246
For a discussion of the procedural hurdles to director liability, see Harry G. Hutchison,
Presumptive Business Judgment, Substantive Good Faith, Litigation Control: Vindicating the
Socioeconomic Meaning of Harhen v. Brown, 26 J. Corp. L. 285, 292 (2001); Carol B.
Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J.
Corp. L. 417, 437 (1996); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell
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procedural rules and standard of review would apply to court analysis of
these claims, it seems unlikely that vesting authority in another group
would alleviate the concerns around the weakness of the enforcement
apparatus.247 Thus, such an alteration may not address the core defect in
the accountability challenges posed by fiduciary duty law as a credible
commitment vehicle.
***
In the end, fiduciary duty law may serve as more shield than sword.
The law shields directors who make commitments to other stakeholders
or otherwise advance interests beyond shareholders and profit but does
very little to ensure that commitments to these groups will be credible.
This is because that law does very little to set rules that ensure directors’
focus on other stakeholders or that would guide directors with respect to
how best to make trade-offs among stakeholders or between stakeholders
and shareholders. Then, too, the law has a decidedly weak enforcement
system. Perhaps more importantly, reforms do not appear to alter this
reality. In this regard, the very discretion that fiduciary duty law provides
produces a credible commitment problem that the law likely cannot
solve.248
B. The SEC: Rule Reluctance and Disclosure Limitations
This Article next focuses on mandated disclosure from the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) because credible commitment
theorists and corporate scholars have placed great weight on the ability of
independent agencies such as the SEC to facilitate credible commitment.
North and other scholars often look to potential independent agencies
when seeking to facilitate or enhance credible commitments because if
those agencies have rulemaking authority and the capacity to enforce
those rules, independent agencies offer the promise of fairness and
impartiality and thus the promise of strong credible commitment
vehicles.249 Rock has argued that the SEC’s mandated disclosure regime
serves as a valuable source of credible commitment for public
L. Rev. 261, 286 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 261,
326–27 (1981).
247
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 112–13.
248
See Springer, supra note 232, at 124 (noting that fiduciary law simply cannot provide the
“quick fix” for ensuring that directors pay attention to other stakeholders).
249
See Krapohl, supra note 138, at 521; Nellis, supra note 123, at 273.
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companies.250 In Rock’s view, the SEC’s extensive and detailed mandated
disclosure regime operates as an invaluable rule-setting vehicle for
credible commitments, particularly because the regime helps to ensure the
quality of disclosed information.251 Rock also maintains that the SEC’s
mandated disclosure regime addresses concerns about long-term
commitments by committing public companies to a certain level of
quality periodic disclosure that spans the time they remain public.252 In
addition, the elaborate public and private enforcement mechanisms
available to the SEC provide the kind of significant enforcement
necessary for credible commitments.253
The emphasis on the SEC begs an important question about how
mandated disclosure promotes the rule-setting and accountability
necessary to facilitate credible commitment. The answer is that disclosure
impacts behavior, albeit indirectly, because the obligation to disclose
focuses corporate attention on particular issues, thereby guiding behavior
with respect to those issues.254 In this regard, disclosure operates as an
indirect rule. Importantly, in an environment where shareholders and
other stakeholders have demonstrated a desire for greater sustainability
disclosure,255 mandated disclosure increases the likelihood that
companies without particular policies and practices will adopt them to
ward off potential shareholder and stakeholder backlash.256 As one expert
observes, “It’s easier to do than to make up a reason why you didn’t, and
it’s certainly less embarrassing.”257
250

See Rock, supra note 121, at 685, 688.
Id.
252
See id. at 694.
253
See id. at 687–88, 703. Rock also notes that the history and range of enforcement options
makes the SEC a more viable source of credible commitment than contractual arrangements
or the stock exchanges. See id. at 696–97.
254
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859, 861 (2003) (arguing that disclosure is
the most important tool for regulating public company behavior); Paul Rissman & Diana
Kearney, Rise of the Shadow ESG Regulators: Investment Advisers, Sustainability
Accounting, and Their Effects on Corporate Social Responsibility, 49 Env’t. L. Rep. 10155,
10160 (2019) (asserting that disclosure serves as a primary mechanism for influencing
corporate behavior); Lipton, supra note 116, at 509 (suggesting that disclosure obligations
indirectly guide corporate behavior).
255
See infra notes 266 and 267.
256
See Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10160 (noting that disclosure alters behavior
because of effort to prevent bad outcomes).
257
Jill Goldsmith, Corporate Boards Will Get More Diverse in 2021 with Social Justice Jolt,
New Regs, Covid Impact, Deadline (Dec. 30, 2020, 1:35 PM), https://deadline.com/202
251
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As this observation suggests, the most valuable aspect of disclosure is
its impact on accountability. This is because accurate and effective
disclosure is designed to empower shareholders, stakeholders, and
regulators to police corporate conduct.258 Disclosure impacts
accountability in at least three vital ways. First, disclosure provides
valuable information to shareholders and other stakeholders who can use
the information to pressure corporations to adopt certain policies and
practices or otherwise alter their behavior.259 Second, including disclosure
in SEC filings increases the likelihood of board oversight, better ensuring
that the board will pay heed to these issues and hold management
accountable for them.260 Third, disclosure enables the SEC to use its
enforcement tools to hold companies accountable for inaccurate or
misleading disclosures.
The SEC also appears to be a viable source of credible commitment
because its rules apply to all public companies, thus offering a source of
broad reach. Moreover, so long as a company is public, it must comply
with the SEC’s disclosure rules, ensuring that commitments associated
with those rules are credible over an extended period of time.261
Alas, current law mandates very little in the realm of key information
related to employees, customers, clients and suppliers.262 Rock and others
insist that in order for the SEC to serve as a useful source of credible
0/12/url-media-company-boards-diversity-push-2021-outlook-1234663128/ [https://perma.c
c/9UL8-ZNDN] (quoting executive director of MSCI ESG Research).
258
See Jena Martin, Hiding in the Light: The Misuse of Disclosure to Advance the Business
and Human Rights Agenda, 56 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 530, 535–36 (2018); Lipton, supra note
116, at 509; Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775,
822–23 (2006); Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10160 (asserting that disclosure
impacts behavior by making bad behavior an expensive prospect).
259
See, e.g., Impact Management Project, Statement of Intent to Work Together Towards
Comprehensive Corporate Reporting 2 (2020) [hereinafter Statement of Intent], https://29kjw
b3armds2g3gi4lq2sx1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Statement-of-Intent-toWork-Together-Towards-Comprehensive-Corporate-Reporting.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5CBC2JG].
260
Some advocates believe that mandated disclosure on its own, as opposed to voluntary
reporting, better ensures board oversight of such disclosure because the board pays closer
attention to information required to be reported by the SEC. However, it may be that additional
work needs to be done to ensure appropriate board oversight. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making
Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 Geo. L.J. 923, 957–58 (2019) (proposing that rules
be created that require boards to oversee the reporting process related to social issues and that
there be a board certification process akin to that mandated for financial reporting).
261
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 508.
262
See Fisch, supra note 260, at 934–40 (describing mandates of discrete information related
to ESG and sustainability concerns).
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commitments, its disclosure rules must involve a mandate.263 Without
such a mandate, the level, nature, and extent of the disclosure would be
suboptimal and thus ineffective for purposes of credible commitment.264
Unfortunately, our experience with voluntary disclosure related to
stakeholder-related issues only underscores the importance of mandated
disclosure.265 In 2018, more than eighty-six percent of S&P 500
companies had issued corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) or
sustainability reports, up from some twenty percent in 2011.266 Beyond
these sustainability reports, there also is voluntary corporate disclosure
related to human capital and other sustainability issues both within the
proxy statement and in other publicly available documents.267 However,
because there are no uniform rules or guidelines that dictate exactly what
is contained in the current body of disclosed information, the vast
majority of commentators agree that the reported information is
suboptimal, not only because it is too vague and often fails to provide
meaningful information, but also because it varies widely from one
company to another.268 Importantly, one law firm acknowledged that
263

See Rock, supra note 121, at 690–91. Other scholars have also pointed out the importance
of mandated disclosure to ensuring that corporations comply with particular obligations. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 Va. L. Rev. 669, 695 (1984); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (1995); Prentice, supra note 258,
at 819.
264
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 722 (1984).
265
See Prentice, supra note 258, at 807 (noting that voluntary disclosure in this area is
strategic rather than optimal). Prentice also notes that voluntary financial disclosure has also
proven ineffective and suboptimal. Id. at 806–07.
266
See Governance & Accountability Inst., Flash Report: 86% of S&P 500 Index
Companies Publish Sustainability Reports in 2018, GlobeNewswire (May 16, 2019, 10:00
ET), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/05/16/1826306/0/en/FLASH-REP
ORT-86-of-S-P-500-Index-Companies-Publish-Sustainability-Reports-in-2018.html [https://
perma.cc/RT62-DE7Y]; Jill M. D’Aquila, The Current State of Sustainability Reporting, CPA
J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com/2018/07/30/the-current-state-of-sustainabilityreporting/ [https://perma.cc/7MU3-BF36].
267
See Steve Klemash, Bridget M. Neill & Jamie C. Smith, How and Why Human Capital
Disclosures are Evolving, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Gov. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/15/how-and-why-human-capital-disclosures-are-ev
olving/ [https://perma.cc/FF2F-MMSE].
268
See id. (detailing 2019 study of proxy data related to human capital for Fortune 100
companies); Esty & Karpilow, supra note 94, at 657; Lipton, supra note 116, at 561–62 (noting
that voluntary reports related to sustainability are “demonstrably insufficient” and
“notoriously incomplete and inconsistent”); Fisch, supra note 260, at 947–52; Virginia Harper
Ho & Stephen Kim Park, ESG Disclosure in Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private
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voluntary disclosures are “carefully drafted” so as not to be viewed as
“formal commitments.”269
The lack of mandated disclosure also undermines the extent to which
disclosure can serve as a useful accountability mechanism. First, the
SEC’s powerful enforcement capabilities cannot be utilized unless and
until the SEC mandates obligations that it can enforce. Second, without
consistent, reliable, and effective disclosure, it is difficult for shareholders
and stakeholders to effectively monitor corporate behavior and thus play
an accountability role.270
The credible commitment potential of the SEC’s disclosure regime has
led many stakeholderism advocates to call for mandated disclosure in this
area. These calls have both practical and theoretical limitations.
1. The Feasibility Concern
On the one hand, the recent change in administration may signal an
opportunity to mandate disclosure in this area. On the other hand, the
current and historical resistance to such a mandate appears to be a
significant stumbling block. There have been periodic efforts to obtain
disclosure on issues related to stakeholders, and most of those efforts have
proven unsuccessful.271 Indeed, it is around these very issues that the SEC
appears most resistant to require disclosure.272 Perhaps most importantly,
it is around these very issues that corporations and their allies appear most
vocal and motivated to prevent change.273

Ordering in Public Reporting, 41 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 249, 266–68 (2019); Barnali Choudhury,
Social Disclosure, 13 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 183, 211 (2016); D’Aquila, supra note 266; Prentice,
supra note 258, at 807.
269
Lipton, supra note 116, at 561–62 (quoting memo from Mayer Brown).
270
See id. at 567 (noting that clear stakeholder-oriented disclosures have the potential to
ensure more robust enforcement).
271
See, e.g., id. at 537–53 (detailing historical calls for stakeholder-oriented disclosure);
Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10162–63 (describing cycles of efforts to advance
disclosure and SEC reluctance); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1235 (1999). Ann
Lipton insists that efforts to promote disclosure within the securities law framework are
doomed to fail because they seek to conceal the true intent of disclosure and frame disclosure
as meant for investor audiences only. Lipton, supra note 116, at 556–57.
272
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 258, at 547 (noting, for example, the SEC’s reluctance
around the resource extraction rule).
273
See Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10167–68 (describing intense efforts of
Business Roundtable and other influential business groups aimed at blocking mandated
sustainability disclosure).
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2. Limitations of Disclosure
Even if we manage to get significant rulemaking around stakeholder
issues, credible commitment theory suggests that mandated disclosure
may be a flawed commitment vehicle. First, it is not entirely clear that
mandated disclosure can generate a set of clear rules or guiding principles.
Indeed, whether disclosure leads to the adoption of clear rules facilitating
behavior may depend upon the SEC’s willingness to choose certainty in
its rulemaking over deference. The SEC’s principles-based approach to
disclosure translates into the SEC favoring corporate flexibility over clear
definitions and guidelines. Unfortunately, research reveals that when the
SEC is not sufficiently specific about required disclosure obligations,
those obligations are less likely to result in clear rules that alter
behavior.274 For example, with respect to disclosure related to board
diversity, the SEC chose not to define diversity, instead deferring to
boards about how best to define the term.275 For those hoping the
disclosure obligation would lead to an indirect rule increasing board
diversity, this deference dashed those hopes.276 Research reveals that the
disclosure obligation had little impact on generating a rule that impacted
behavior because the obligation was too vague.277 Importantly, the SEC’s
recent disclosure obligations related to human capital suffer from the
same flaw, shying away from offering specific guidance about the types
of behaviors associated with human capital management, and thereby
suggesting that the SEC remains reluctant to provide the clarity that would
facilitate credible commitment.278
Then, too, it may be that the ability to create clarity through disclosure
is especially challenging with respect to stakeholderism. Our history with
mandated disclosure in general suggests that the disclosure obligations
most likely to generate clear rules are those that are procedural or
relatively simple and straightforward. For example, it is relatively easy to
see how a disclosure obligation related to whether or not a company has
a committee of independent directors could result in a “rule” encouraging

274

See Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substantive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94
Ind. L.J. 145, 184 (2019).
275
See id. at 183–84.
276
See id. at 185–86.
277
See id. at 184–86.
278
See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358,
44,388 (Aug. 23, 2019) (requiring description of human capital resources).
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companies to have such directors.279 By contrast, disclosures related to
stakeholderism contemplate much more complex and voluminous
information. For example, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(“SASB”), one of the leading independent nonprofits that sets standards
to guide sustainability disclosure, has developed a comprehensive set of
seventy-seven industry-specific sustainability disclosure standards along
with a range of metrics associated with how best to disclose particular
information.280 This kind of complexity may undermine the ability to
encourage straightforward rules. In September of 2020, the five leading
sustainability reporting institutions that collectively guide the
overwhelming majority of qualitative and quantitative sustainability
disclosures in the world came together to issue a statement of intent about
how best to generate comprehensive and effective sustainability
disclosure.281 The statement of intent was framed by the
acknowledgement that disclosure in this area is much more complex than
financial reporting because of the nature of the topics and the many
different stakeholder interests associated with those topics.282 Indeed, the
statement of intent noted that, despite decades of efforts to produce
sustainability frameworks and standards, the disclosure landscape
remains confusing, in large part because of the complex nature of seeking
to develop clear standards associated with the myriad of topics embedded
in stakeholderism.283 The statement of intent highlights the difficulties
with relying on disclosure to overcome the certainty challenges associated
with credible commitment in this area. At the very least, the statement of
intent suggests that overcoming those challenges may take some time.
In order to overcome credible commitment challenges, disclosure must
address the trade-off concern or at least provide some guidance in this
area. Unfortunately, it is not clear if disclosure can adequately address
this issue. Professor Jill Fisch has proposed a reform that would require
279
See Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director
Independence Disclosure, 43 J. Corp. L. 35, 45–46, 52 (2017) (explaining manner in which
regulatory changes related to director independence accelerated director independence at
public companies).
280
See Materiality Map, Sustainability Acct. Standards Bd. (2018), https://www.sasb.org/w
p-content/uploads/2021/11/MMap-2021.png [https://perma.cc/8LFT-V2PB].
281
See Statement of Intent, supra note 259, at 2–4 (describing collaboration among the
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”),
Climate Disclosure Standards Board (“CDSB”), International Integrated Reporting Council
(“IIRC”), and CDP).
282
See id. at 2.
283
See id. at 2–3.
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companies to identify and discuss the three most important social issues
to their operations.284 Such a proposal may respond to trade-off concerns
by enabling corporations to prioritize stakeholder issues, at least at a
broad level. However, Fisch acknowledges that one drawback of her
proposal is that it does not capture all of the issues around which
corporations must make trade-offs.285 Unfortunately, proposals that seek
to be more comprehensive fail to address trade-off issues altogether.
While the SASB standards are aimed at enabling corporations to tailor
disclosure to their specific industries, those standards do not offer
guidance or metrics around how corporations make trade-offs within
specific industries.286
There are also important accountability flaws with disclosure. In the
context of disclosure, rather than policing noncompliance with
substantive conduct, the SEC will be limited to policing for inaccuracies
and misleading information. This means that so long as corporations
accurately disclose, corporations can engage in problematic behaviors
without facing regulatory consequences.287 Thus, the SEC’s impressive
array of enforcement tools may be of limited utility in a regime focused
on disclosure, thereby undermining hopes for accountability.
There are also limits to the extent to which disclosure will result in
shareholders and other stakeholders holding corporations accountable for
underlying behavior. Reliance on shareholders as an accountability check
means being dependent on shareholders remaining committed to policing
corporate behaviors focused on stakeholder concerns. As this Article has
mentioned elsewhere, shareholders have been leading the way in this area,
including pressing for more significant disclosure and engagement.288
Moreover, recent cases in which shareholders have brought suit against
corporations for misleading disclosures related to social issues reveal that
shareholders may be willing to play a more robust accountability role in

284

See Fisch, supra note 260, at 956–59 (proposing the adoption of Sustainability
Discussion and Analysis modeled after existing Management Discussion and Analysis).
285
See id. at 959–61.
286
The rules provide a framework for disclosure, but they do not provide guidance on tradeoffs. See Materiality Map, supra note 280.
287
See Martin, supra note 258, at 570. In the context of other social rules such as resource
extraction, Martin suggests that we cannot depend upon the SEC to use its enforcement powers
given its seeming reluctance to interfere with business practices involving social issues. See
id. at 547.
288
See Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10171 (noting shareholders’ impact on
corporate sustainability measures).
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this area.289 Hence, there is at least potential that shareholders can play an
accountability role in this area. Nonetheless, there is still concern that
shareholders may not serve any accountability function with respect to
issues around which shareholders are not aligned with stakeholders. Many
also have expressed concern that activist shareholders may pressure
corporations to ignore stakeholder concerns or may target corporations
for focusing on such concerns.290 These observations suggest that reliance
on shareholders has both benefits and drawbacks.
Advocates also hope that more robust disclosure will enhance nonshareholder stakeholders’ ability to hold corporations accountable.
Importantly, there is a growing recognition that stakeholders consume
corporate disclosure and use that disclosure to assess corporate behavior,
particularly with respect to social issues.291 However, whether or not
stakeholders can serve as an accountability check depends on their ability
to digest disclosed information, their willingness to pressure corporations,
and corporations’ sensitivity to that pressure. On the one hand, research
reveals that today’s stakeholders are more willing and better equipped to
exert pressure on corporations, particularly with respect to matters related
to social concerns.292 Research also indicates that today’s public company
is much more vulnerable to external pressure and thus more likely to bow
to such pressure.293 On the other hand, research also confirms that external
stakeholder pressure is a “clumsy” accountability vehicle for many
reasons.294 Even with more reliable information, available research
confirms that stakeholders may not be fully capable of understanding the
289
See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019); In re Boeing Co. Derivative
Litig., No. 2019-0907, 2021 WL 4059934, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2021); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120–21 (Del. Ch. 2009).
290
See Rissman & Kearney, supra note 254, at 10164–65.
291
See Lipton, supra note 116, at 556–57; Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note
113, at 148; Sale, Public Governance, supra note 113, at 1034–35.
292
See Esty & Karpilow, supra note 94, at 633–34; Robert G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist &
Roland Schatz, Reputation and Its Risks, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Feb. 2007), https://hbr.org/20
07/02/reputation-and-its-risks#:~:text=Executives%20know%20the%20importance%20of,ra
nges%20of%20products%20and%20services [https://perma.cc/R74D-3BKY].
293
See Larkin, supra note 110, at 9; Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law,
26 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 7–8 (2015); Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 Duke
L.J. 907, 929 (2018); Tillmann Wagner, Richard J. Lutz & Barton A. Weitz, Corporate
Hypocrisy: Overcoming the Threat of Inconsistent Corporate Social Responsibility
Perceptions, 73 J. Mktg. 77, 83 (2009).
294
See Parella, supra note 293, at 961 (noting that relying on external reputational
sanctioning by stakeholders may result in unpredictable, attenuated, unrealized, and
unintended consequences); Martin, supra note 258, at 577–79.
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information, undermining their ability to monitor or impact corporate
behavior.295 Stakeholders also may not be able to effectively detect or
respond to all instances of inappropriate behaviors.296 This often stems
from the fact that information may be too complex or voluminous for
stakeholders to digest.297 Then, too, research indicates that stakeholders
often overreact to certain misbehaviors and underreact to others,
increasing the potential that stakeholders may be an imperfect vehicle for
monitoring corporate behavior.298 Buttressing this concern, research
reveals that stakeholders (both shareholders and non-shareholders) have
biases that may undermine their ability to appropriately detect and assess
corporate misbehavior.299 In addition to concerns about the ability to
process and react to disclosed information, research reveals that it is often
difficult for stakeholders to remain vigilant over the long term, decreasing
the likelihood that they can generate the sustained pressure needed to
create lasting or structural changes.300
Finally, because disclosure does not mandate substantive behavior, it
is entirely possible that corporations will not be susceptible to stakeholder
pressure. Indeed, even in this current environment, research reveals that
the “naming and shaming” employed by stakeholders to constrain
corporate behavior does not work on every corporation, especially some
of the most problematic corporations.301 In light of these concerns,
credible commitment theorists have warned that external pressure from
stakeholders has severe limitations and thus may not be the most effective
source of accountability for facilitating credible commitment.302

295

See Martin, supra note 258, at 576–77.
See id.
297
See id.
298
See Shapira, supra note 293, at 10.
299
See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 5, 14–15 (2003).
300
See Parella, supra note 293, at 959.
301
See Martin, supra note 258, at 574–75, 574 nn.192–93 (citing research).
302
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 13; Rock, supra
note 121, at 685–86; see also Esty & Karpilow, supra note 94, at 635 (warning of the limits of
stakeholder pressure for holding corporations accountable for sustainability goals).
296
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C. Credible Commitment and Compensation
Another noteworthy reform is one that seeks to tie attainment of social
goals to executive compensation.303 This solution has appeal. Research
suggests that executives are highly sensitive to their compensation, and
thus tying corporate goals to compensation can incentivize executive
behavior towards meeting those goals.304 Most of the current
compensation structures are aimed at producing alignment with
shareholders and financial goals.305 The hope is that incorporating social
goals into compensation will increase attention to—and focus on—those
goals. Indeed, two prominent compensation consultants have referred to
tying compensation to sustainability goals as the “final link in the chain
of improving corporate accountability for sustainability.”306
Alas, this solution has flaws from a credible commitment standpoint.
First, and most obviously, it only focuses on accountability; it fails to
establish clear rules. Advocates of this reform appreciate that it can only
produce its intended results if we are clear about what is being measured
303
See Mark Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse Fried & Charles Wang, The Sustainable
Corporate Governance Initiative in Europe, 38 Yale J. on Regul. Bull. 133, 149–50 (2021);
Minow, supra note 51; Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 140–53 (noting compensation
reforms linking executive pay with stakeholder concerns); Kay et al., supra note 9; Seymour
Burchman, A New Framework for Executive Compensation, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance (Mar. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/13/a-new-frameworkfor-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/2BCC-SZ7D]; Seymour Burchman & Mark
Emanuel, A Stakeholder Approach and Executive Compensation, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance (Oct. 8, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/08/a-stakeholderapproach-and-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/P3WZ-ZCAU].
304
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 140–47 (noting importance of compensation
to director behavior); Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the
Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp.
L. 255, 257 (2005) (highlighting how few areas more closely aligned with executive interests
than pay); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 761 (2002)
[hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power]; Lund, supra note 17, at 1630–32.
305
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 141.
306
Seymour Burchman & Blair Jones, 5 Steps for Tying Executive Compensation to
Sustainability, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July 19, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/07/5-steps-for-tyingexecutive-compensation-to-sustainability [https://perma.cc/99KK-AQ38]; see also Don
Delves, Stakeholder Capitalism, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance, WTW
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2019/09/stakeholdercapitalism-executive-compensation-and-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/Q8S4-JKS
B] (noting that in order to ensure corporate focus on stakeholder concerns, executive
compensation must change); Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social
Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1419 (2020) (noting that the strongest indicator of ESG’s
strength is the effort to link incentive pay with ESG goals).
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and how best to link measurable goals with compensation.307 The second
flaw stems from the uncertain nature of executive compensation reform
as an accountability metric. In other words, to the extent supporters hope
that this reform can serve as a form of accountability, many have
expressed serious doubts about whether regulating corporate behavior
through executive compensation can actually achieve its intended goal of
aligning that behavior with stakeholder interests.308 The next Sections
discuss both of these issues.
1. The Uncertain Road to Rule Clarity
As an initial matter, the process of generating clear metrics for
advancing stakeholder goals within the compensation framework is likely
to be extremely challenging. Commentators and compensation experts
agree: currently, there are no clear standards and there is no clear
consensus around how best to measure social goals in the context of
compensation.309 Moreover, the process of pinpointing clear measures
aimed at linking executive compensation to shareholder interests and
financial goals has been fraught with challenges.310 And this process
relates to creating compensation measurements for shareholder interests
which are viewed as “relatively well-defined and measurable.”311 Any
challenges in designing compensation schemes will be magnified by
seeking to tie stakeholder goals with compensation because of the
multiplicity of interests and the need to make clear how trade-offs will be
307

See Roe et al., supra note 303, at 150.
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 156–58; David I. Walker, The Challenge of
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 450 (2010).
309
See Josh Cable, Report: Majority of S&P 500 Firms Link Sustainability to CEO
Compensation, EHS Today (May 9, 2014), https://www.ehstoday.com/environment/articl
e/21916304/report-majority-of-sp-500-firms-link-sustainability-to-ceo-compensation
[https://perma.cc/YQJ8-9HVW] (noting that there was “much room for improvement” in the
way companies incorporated sustainability factors into compensation); Burchman & Jones,
supra note 306; Delves, supra note 306.
310
See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Executive Compensation 61, 80 (2004); Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive
Compensation, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 695, 707–08 (2016); Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere,
Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J.
Corp. L. 487, 493–94 (2013); Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power, supra note 304, at 789–93
(describing the obstacle of camouflage and compensation); Mark J. Loewenstein, The
Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 10 (2000); Susan J.
Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Compensation Positively Affect
Managerial Performance?, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 227, 232–33 (1999).
311
See Bebchuck & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 159.
308
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reconciled.312 Accurate measurement may be particularly hard because
some goals and interests may not be easily measurable or quantifiable,
especially in the short term.313 The fact that we have been struggling to
generate reliable and accurate sustainability measures for more than three
decades underscores the challenging nature of this process and raises
concerns about linking that process with the current challenges of setting
appropriate compensation. At the very least, these observations suggest
getting rule clarity around this issue may be a long and arduous process.
Unless and until we can pinpoint how best to establish rules in this area,
linking compensation to stakeholder concerns may not serve to facilitate
credible commitment.
Illustrative of this point, many companies already purport to link social
goals with executive compensation, but research suggests that their efforts
are less than satisfying because such companies do not have clear
measurements in place. Thus, a 2014 study indicates that a majority of
S&P 500 companies reported having compensation practices that link
executive pay to sustainability goals.314 Similarly, a 2013 study revealed
that forty-three percent of companies reported linking executive pay to
ESG goals.315 However, a study of S&P 500 companies published in 2016
found that most companies relied on targets and measurements that were
ineffective and thus failed to lead to improved behavior with respect to
identifiable social goals.316 Importantly, commentators note that it is
difficult to pinpoint an accurate number of companies linking social goals
to compensation precisely because there is disagreement about how best
to measure whether or not companies are capturing social goals within
their compensation framework.317 Consistent with credible commitment
312
See id. (speculating that seeking to tie compensation to stakeholders would be “orders of
magnitude more challenging” than the challenges posed by linking to shareholder interests);
Walker, supra note 308, at 450 (“We have little experience with very long-term executive
incentive pay arrangements and really no idea which instruments would best link pay and
performance over longer periods.”).
313
See Bebchuck & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 159; Ben Schwefel, Note, “Green”
Performance: The Future of Performance-Based Executive Compensation?, 6 San Diego J.
Climate & Energy L. 247, 262 (2015); Walker, supra note 308, at 450.
314
See Cable, supra note 309.
315
See Amy Knieriem, Carol Silverman, Susan Eichen & Kim Moriarty, Focus on
Corporate Sustainability, 22 Corp. Governance Advisor, 2014 WL 12813826 (citing 2013
study revealing that forty-three percent of companies reported linking executive pay to ESG
goals).
316
See Karen Maas, Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive Compensation
Contribute to Corporate Social Performance?, 148 J. Bus. Ethics 573, 581 (2018).
317
See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 306, at 1420.
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theory, the lack of sufficient rules undermines the ability of executive
compensation to serve its credible commitment function.
Importantly, trade-off concerns are especially challenging in this area,
further undermining the effort to gain rule clarity and thus hoped-for
credible commitment. Indeed, there exists an array of potential social
goals, and thus corporations must wrestle with which goals they will link
to compensation.318 Pinpointing how best to prioritize goals or what
weight different goals should be given will likely be challenging,
especially because it may need to change over time. The fact that
corporations can engage in both good and bad acts simultaneously means
that considering trade-offs and prioritization in this area will be especially
salient or else there will be a risk that executives will be rewarded even
when they engage in practices that some stakeholders view as
problematic. As credible commitment theory suggests, failing to resolve
these critical trade-off issues will undermine the ability to rely on
executive compensation as a viable credible commitment vehicle.
2. Accountability Illusions?
Even if we manage to pinpoint clear metrics, it is not clear if tying
compensation to those metrics will further accountability goals. Our
experience in the realm of executive compensation more broadly has
revealed that the practice of seeking to achieve particular goals through
compensation does not reliably work. Thus, throughout history we have
adopted several regulations aimed at altering pay practices to curb
compensation, and while those regulations successfully altered pay
practices, they failed to reduce overall compensation.319 Studies seeking
to determine if linking social goals to compensation has an appreciable
impact on corporate attention to those goals have found mixed results.
Thus, one recent study indicates that linking social goals to executive
compensation can lead to an increase in social initiatives and the
advancement of particular climate goals.320 However, that study questions
whether compensation metrics can similarly impact other goals. Another
study found no link between the use of social metrics in executive
compensation and improvements in corporate activity benefitting
318

See Bebchuck & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 159; Walker, supra note 308, at 450.
See supra notes 312 and 313.
320
See Caroline Flammer, Bryan Hong & Dylan Minor, Corporate Governance and the Rise
of Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility Criteria in Executive Compensation:
Effectiveness and Implications for Firm Outcomes, 40 Strategic Mgmt. J. 1097, 1099 (2019).
319
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stakeholders.321 A closer look at the data suggested that this result
stemmed in large part from the fact that the vast majority of corporations
choose soft, qualitative, hard-to-quantify measures when linking social
goals to compensation.322 These studies confirm the importance of
accurate measures while also raising questions about whether those
measures can achieve the goal of promoting all kinds of socially desirable
corporate behavior.
Importantly, our experience with seeking to regulate corporate
behavior through compensation has revealed that it is difficult to use
incentive payment structures to impact executive behavior for several
reasons. First, there are several legal and extralegal factors that impact
executive behavior beyond compensation, and hence those factors may
mute or counteract the impact of pay arrangements.323 Second, incentive
compensation not only is one of several components of executive pay
arrangements but also is generally a relatively small component of overall
pay packages.324 This means that incorporating social goals into incentive
pay arrangements means squeezing those goals into an already small
aspect of total executive compensation. More importantly, our experience
has indicated that the small portion of pay attributable to these incentive
structures may not be sufficient to impact executive and thus corporate
behavior.325 Third, unless incentive pay is linked to factors around which
executives have control, there will be a misalignment.326 Tying an
executive’s compensation to issues over which she has no control
undermines the ability of compensation to impact her performance while
potentially rewarding or punishing her inappropriately.327 Fourth,
321

See Maas, supra note 316, at 581–82.
See id. at 581–83 (indicating that hard, quantitative measures can lead to results).
323
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 308, at 452; Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power, supra note
304, at 772; Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 310, at 80.
324
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 310, at 121–22; Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay
Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 Emory L.J. 1557, 1566–67 (2005)
(noting that compensation packages consist of several different components, and the incentive
element often constitutes a small percentage); Kay et al., supra note 9 (noting that incentive
metrics associated with social goals count for five to twenty percent of annual incentive goals);
Sullivan & Cromwell, Sustainability Matters: The Rise of ESG Metrics in Executive
Compensation 3 (2020), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-Sustainabil
ity-Matters-The-Rise-of-ESG-Metrics-in-Executive-Compensation.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7
HM-C8AN] (noting one study revealing that ESG factors only comprise five percent of total
incentive compensation).
325
See Anabtawi, supra note 324, at 1566–67.
326
See Roe et al., supra note 303, at 150.
327
See Anabtawi, supra note 324, at 1563, 1566.
322
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executive compensation arrangements are capable of manipulation,
particularly given that executives continue to have a large role in the pay
process.328 For example, if targets are set around goals that are already
reached or are relatively insignificant, pay arrangements will not serve to
meaningfully advance social purpose goals.329
Finally, our experience reveals that there is a serious possibility of
unintended consequences associated with tying compensation to
corporate goals, thereby undermining accountability.330 Many worry
about the possibility that linking compensation to specific goals can create
perverse incentives for executives. For example, tying compensation to
stock price had the unintended consequence of executives over-focusing
on that measure of performance, leading to risky and in some cases
fraudulent executive conduct.331 Moreover, tying executive compensation
to stock and equity compensation had the unintended consequence of
substantially increasing overall executive compensation.332
This reform also poses accountability challenges because it does not
appropriately wrestle with the role of shareholders in the compensation
process.333 Shareholders have discretion over executive compensation,
particularly through their advisory vote on executive compensation
(“[s]ay on pay”).334 When shareholders exercise their vote, their primary
focus has been whether executive pay is linked to financial
performance.335 Moreover, as a result of the say on pay vote, corporations
have made considerable efforts to ensure that their pay packages are
linked to financial performance.336 As with other areas, shareholders’
heightened role over compensation raises the question of how much
328

See Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power, supra note 304, at 767.
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 160–61.
330
See id. at 159–60; Lund, supra note 17, at 1630.
331
See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Essay, Reforming Executive Compensation:
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 Yale J. on Regul. 359, 362 (2009).
332
See Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power, supra note 304, at 792–93; Bhagat & Romano,
supra note 331, at 362–63; John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 274 (2004); Kevin J. Murphy,
Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock
Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 850 (2004).
333
See Bebchuck & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 161.
334
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary Duties,
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Fairfax, Sue on Pay].
335
See id. at 36; Semler Brossy, 2021 Say on Pay & Proxy Results 3–4 (2022),
https://semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/SBCG-2021-SOP-Report-2022-01-31
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5W-BQV6].
336
See Fairfax, Sue on Pay, supra note 334, at 37–38.
329
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shareholders will be willing to sacrifice in order to enable corporations to
pursue stakeholder issues. Compensation consultants worry that
shareholders and proxy advisors may object to an overemphasis on
stakeholder concerns.337 This objection will carry significant weight given
shareholders’ influential role over compensation practices.338 No reform
has engaged the issue regarding how best to reconcile the potentially
competing concerns that may emerge between existing say on pay
incentives and those embedded in the desire to link pay to stakeholder
goals. At the very least, this reform poses a credibility concern because of
the lack of stakeholder voice associated with accountability.
IV. CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS AND THE VALUE OF NORMS
As the discussion in Part III suggests, many of the most promising
existing vehicles for establishing credible commitment have deficiencies,
and there is reason to believe that some of those deficiencies cannot be
overcome. That discussion may therefore suggest strong reason for
pessimism about the ability of reforms to facilitate credible commitment
and thus genuinely influence corporate behavior. Indeed, several
prominent scholars have concluded that the kind of credible commitment
flaws highlighted in this Article render efforts to actualize stakeholderism
infeasible.339 This Article rejects that conclusion and instead salvages the
importance of these reforms to credible commitment by demonstrating
that those reforms can serve a very vital normative function.340
A. Norms Defined
This Article uses the term “norms” to refer to expectations regarding
how individuals ought to behave.341 In this regard, norms are aspirational

337
See Kay et al., supra note 9 (noting that shareholders and proxy advisors “may react
adversely to non-financial metrics weighted more than 10% to 20% of annual incentive
scorecards”).
338
See id.
339
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 157; Rock, For Whom is the Corporation
Managed?, supra note 13, at 394; Lund, supra note 17, at 1619–21.
340
See Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1339–40
(noting that while corporate purpose cannot be used to compel benevolent social behavior, it
does have an instrumental value, enabling corporations to direct and manage stakeholder
expectation and also gain a comparative advantage).
341
See Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, supra note 19, at 11; Bicchieri, The Grammar of
Society, supra note 19, at 4; Posner, supra note 19, at 8; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note
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and refer to behaviors that individuals are expected to follow and that
individuals expect others to follow.342 A norm also refers to behavior for
which you believe you will be punished if you fail to follow or for which
you believe you should punish others for their failure to follow.343 Thus,
the behavioral expectation of a norm is supported by the strong sense that
compliance will be rewarded while noncompliance will be condemned.
Along these same lines, norms in the corporate context refer to
expectations regarding how corporations and corporate actors ought to
behave. Thus, corporate purpose can be viewed as a normative
expectation regarding the interests that corporations and corporate actors
ought to consider and advance when making business decisions. By
extension, stakeholderism can be viewed as the normative expectation
that corporations and corporate actors ought to consider and advance the
interests of all stakeholders.344
B. Impact of Norms on Behavior
1. Norms Generally
There is a voluminous body of research confirming that norms
influence behavior.345 This research reveals that individuals learn about
19, at 914; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021,
2032 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function]; Cooter, supra note 19, at 1656.
342
See supra note 341.
343
See supra note 341.
344
As so defined, the stakeholderism norm does not resolve the tension between so-called
enlightened shareholder primacy, which considers stakeholders because that consideration
enhances shareholders’ interest, and “true” stakeholderism, which views shareholders as one
among many stakeholders and thus does not prioritize them. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra
note 1, at 94, 97.
345
See, e.g., Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, supra note 19, at 11–12; Gary S. Becker,
Accounting for Tastes 225 (1996); Donald J. Black, The Behavior of Law 118–19 (1976);
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1769 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1787–88 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractional Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115,
134–35 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; David Abrams, Roberto Galbiati, Emeric
Henry & Arnaud Philippe, When in Rome... On Local Norms and Sentencing Decisions 4
(Scis. Po, Working Paper No. 2019-04, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=3357122 [https://perma.cc/2HPZ-RXSX]; David A. Hoffman & Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 395, 422–23
(2013); Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal
Systems, 22 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 20–22 (2004); Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences
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appropriate norms from their broader social and non-social
environment.346 The research also reveals that adherence to norms is
reinforced by approvals for those who follow norms and sanctions for
norm violators.347 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, research makes
clear that norms often influence behavior irrespective of formal rules and
enforcement vehicles.348 In other words, because norms refer to
perceptions regarding expected behavior, individuals often will comply
with norms even when there is no external pressure to do so.
2. Norms and Corporate Behavior
Similar to norms in other contexts, corporate scholars have argued that
norms impact corporate behavior and often play a more significant role in
shaping corporate behavior than formal rules and regulations.349 As an
initial matter, there is a voluminous body of research indicating that
norms impact corporate behavior.350 The research also indicates that
norms are often more important than formal rules and sanctions because
corporate actors comply with norms even in the absence of formal legal

and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1, 12–14 (2009); Robert C.
Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 4 (1991); Robert D. Cooter,
Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 Int’l
Rev. L. & Econ. 215, 216 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter, Structural Adjudication]; Sergey
Gavrilets & Peter J. Richerson, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norm
Internalization, 114 PNAS 6068, 6068 (2017); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Usable Theory:
Analytic Tools for Social and Political Research 7–8 (2009).
346
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2026.
347
See supra note 341.
348
See, e.g., North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 12.
349
See infra note 350.
350
See Posner, supra note 19, at 148–53; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust,
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735,
1748–50 (2001) (suggesting that social norms, rather than law and economic incentives,
govern corporate behavior); John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country
Evaluation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2151, 2151–54 (2001); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence
and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 816–17 (2001); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter,
Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1619, 1621–22 (2001); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1811, 1820 (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum.
L. Rev. 1253, 1291–92 (1999) (noting that changes in norms will translate into changes in
corporate behavior); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1016 (1997); Cooter, supra note 19, at 1690–94;
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 946–47 (1995).
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rules or sanctions compelling compliance.351 Although such formalities
can contribute to and reinforce norms regarding appropriate corporate
behavior, corporate scholars have strenuously argued that norm
compliance in the corporate arena does not depend on formal legal rules
and institutions.352 Instead, a prevailing norm will ensure that corporate
actors themselves pinpoint rules to guide their conduct.353 This is because
once a norm takes root, compliance with the norm becomes an end in
itself, not a means to avoid sanction or obtain rewards.354 As a result,
corporate actors conform their behavior to the norm irrespective of
external pressure, sanctions, or rewards.
3. Norms and Credible Commitment
Credible commitment theorists similarly emphasize the importance of
norms for facilitating credible commitment because norms operate to
constrain or guide behavior.355 According to North, when there are norms
supporting particular behavior, those norms facilitate credible
commitment by increasing the likelihood that people within the entire
organization, particularly those tasked with implementing and monitoring
implementation of various institutional commitments, align their behavior
to those commitments.356 Because they involve shaping and guiding
people’s understanding of appropriate behavior, norms play a significant
role in constraining behavior and thus a significant role in credible
commitment.357
Importantly, credible commitment theorists agree with norm scholars
more generally that once a norm has been embraced, it operates
independent of formal rules and enforcement measures.358 Norms not
only “supplement, modify, or reinforce formal rules” but also can be more
important than those rules for constraining or guiding behavior because
they do not depend on external pressure.359 This is because compliance
with a norm becomes an end in itself, not a mechanism to avoid external
disapproval or sanctions or otherwise to garner external rewards or
351

See Langevoort, supra note 350, at 816–17; Skeel, supra note 350, at 1820–22, 1824–26.
See supra note 351.
353
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 12–13.
354
See id.; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2032–33.
355
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 11–12.
356
See id. at 12–13.
357
See id. at 20.
358
See id. at 12.
359
See id.
352
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approval.360 The norm helps ensure commitment compliance because
actors take it upon themselves to exercise their discretion in compliance
with the norm and, by extension, in compliance with the commitment.361
As a result, norms serve to overcome credible commitment challenges by
serving an important gap-filler role.362 Norms ensure that gaps are filled
by individuals themselves when they seek to comply their behavior with
expected norms. In this way, norms are vital to credible commitment
because norms guide discretion and give content to vague aspirations.
Credible commitment theory therefore makes clear that norms serve to
enhance, supplement, and strengthen formal rules and enforcement and
hence serve as an important glue for facilitating credible commitments.
4. Norms and Stakeholderism
Both critics and supporters of stakeholderism have implicitly
recognized the importance of norms to any reform effort. On the one
hand, critics have argued that the current normative environment is too
heavily focused on shareholders and financial performance for
stakeholderism and related reforms to impact corporate behavior.363
Bebchuk and Tallarita insist that the robust incentives associated with
shareholder value undermine the ability to create norms in favor of
stakeholders.364 In this same vein Lund notes, “It is naïve to expect
corporations to do something other than maximize profits when corporate
law’s incentive structure rewards corporate fiduciaries who prioritize
shareholder wealth.”365
By contrast, advocates of stakeholderism hope reforms shift the
normative focus away from shareholder primacy.366 Such advocates
maintain that new rules related to stakeholders are critical for establishing

360

See id; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2032–33.
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 12.
362
See id.
363
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 128; Rock, For Whom is the Corporation
Managed?, supra note 13, at 391–95; Lund, supra note 17, at 1619–20.
364
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 146.
365
Lund, supra note 17, at 1620; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The
Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 776–77 (2015)
(highlighting that it is considered a breach of fiduciary duty to consider “an interest other than
stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder wealth”).
366
See Strine, Restoration, supra note 10, at 428.
361
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norms that encourage corporate behavior that advances stakeholder norms
and shifts the normative focus away from shareholder primacy.367
In this regard, both sides of the stakeholderism debate have
acknowledged the importance of norms in facilitating or destabilizing
credible commitment.
C. Importance of Norm Internalization
Scholars focused on norms have made clear that the best way to ensure
that norms will impact behavior is through the process of norm
internalization.368 Norms can influence behavior as a result of either
external or internal incentives.369 Norms that influence behavior based on
external pressure or incentives stem from rules, laws, or some other
external pressure that incentivizes behavior in compliance with the
norm.370 Some norms are internalized such that acting according to the
norm becomes an end in itself rather than a means to achieve rewards or
avoid sanctions.371 Internalized norms ensure behavioral compliance
without reliance on external pressures or formal rules and enforcement
vehicles.372 Internalized norms are thus more significant than norms that
result from formal external rules because an internalized norm influences
behavior without need to resort to, or depend upon, external rules or
sanctions.373 Hence, there is widespread agreement that internalized
norms are the best mechanism for ensuring that human or institutional
behavior aligns with norms.374
367

See id.
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2031–33; Robert Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 585–86 (1998) [hereinafter Cooter,
Expressive Law]; Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on
Causation, 63 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 523, 539–40 (1987); Kaplow, supra note 194, at 570; see
also Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra note 200, at 63, 71 (explaining that norm
internalization operates to ensure individuals monitor and control their own behavior on the
basis of the norm).
369
See Nellis, supra note 123, at 272–73; North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 4
(noting that constraints can be formal—such as rules, constitutions, or the common law—or
informal such as conventions or codes of behavior); North, Institutions and Credible
Commitment, supra note 122, at 12.
370
See North, Institutional Change, supra note 122, at 4.
371
See id.
372
See id.
373
See id.
374
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2031; Cooter, Expressive Law,
supra note 368, at 585–86; Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra note 200, at 63, 71;
Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 345, at 220–21.
368
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This agreement extends to the credible commitment context. Credible
commitment theorists point out that internalized norms represent a
significant source of credible commitment because they influence
behavior by ensuring that individuals themselves exercise their discretion
consistent with the internalized norm.375 Norm internalization is also
important for facilitating credible commitment because internalized
norms help overcome vagueness and trade-off concerns that create
obstacles for credible commitment. This is possible because once a norm
is internalized, such internalization increases the likelihood that we can
depend upon individuals themselves to make appropriate trade-offs or fill
in gaps left open by vague commitments in a manner that is consistent
with internalized norms.376 As a result, internalized norms not only
reinforce formal rules but also supplement and modify them.377 Thus,
mechanisms that promote norm internalization play a strong role in
facilitating credible commitment.
D. Norm Internalization and Commitment Credibility
1. Factors Promoting Norm Internalization
Credible commitment research pinpoints at least three factors that
facilitate norm internalization. First, there must be some indication that
the embrace of a new norm or a shift in norms is plausible. 378 Such a shift
sets the stage for the internalization of the norm. Second, increased
visibility of the norm,379 along with consistent and repeated exposure to
the norm, enhances norm internalization by increasing the likelihood that
individuals will come to view the norm as an acceptable and desired
aspect of expected behavior.380 Finally, the embrace of the norm by
powerful and influential leaders significantly increases the likelihood of
375

See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 345, at 220–21.
See id. (norms as gap fillers).
377
See North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 122, at 12.
378
See Daniel Villatoro, Guilia Andrighetto, Rosaria Conte & Jordi Sabater-Mir, SelfPolicing Through Norm Internalization: A Cognitive Solution to the Tragedy of the Digital
Commons in Social Networks, 18 J. Artificial Soc’ys & Soc. Simulation, 1 (2015);
Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 77 (explaining that norms can be imposed by a powerful
authority or person); Gavrilets & Richerson, supra note 345, at 6068; Daniel C. Feldman, The
Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, 9 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 47, 50 (1984).
379
See Cristina Bicchieri & Hugo Mercier, Norms and Beliefs: How Change Occurs, 63
Jerusalem Phil. Q. 60, 63–64 (2014).
380
See id.
376
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norm internalization because individuals take their behavioral cues from
such leaders.381 This Article argues that the current environment along
with the cumulative effect of reforms aligns with the aforementioned
factors in a manner that may facilitate norm internalization, thereby
increasing the potential that corporate actors may conform their behavior
to expectations around stakeholderism.
2. Setting the Stage for Internalizing the Stakeholderism Norm
A norm cannot be internalized unless and until the norm achieves some
prevalence because that prevalence helps create a perception about the
desirability and acceptability of a given norm. Indeed, a norm, and thus
norm internalization, is contingent upon individuals’ perceptions of what
society deems appropriate.382 In this regard, the growing embrace of a
norm helps set the stage for norm internalization. Importantly, when a
desired norm runs counter to a preexisting norm, there must be a
normative shift reflecting the embrace of the new norm and thus setting
the stage for internalization of that norm.383 While the existence and even
prevalence of a norm is no guarantee of norm internalization and
behavioral compliance, it does pave the way for norm internalization and
thus increased norm compliance.384
The current environment, coupled with the impact of the push for
reforms related to stakeholderism, may set the stage for norm
internalization related to stakeholderism by increasing the possibility of a
broader normative shift towards stakeholderism. Norms can develop or
shift after several small changes related to a particular expectation, which
is sometimes referred to as “norm bandwagon.”385 In this respect, a prior
norm slowly erodes to give way to a new norm.386 In fact, several
prominent corporate scholars have repeatedly insisted that the shareholder
primacy norm has slowly eroded in favor of stakeholderism.387 The
381

See Cristina Bicchieri & Alexander Funcke, Norm Change: Trendsetters and Social
Structure, 85 Soc. Rsch. 1, 2 (2018) (discussing reference networks, influential leaders, and
trendsetters).
382
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2026.
383
See id. at 2032–33.
384
See Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, supra note 19, at 1–2; Bicchieri & Funcke, supra note
381, at 19.
385
See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 19, at 909.
386
See id.
387
See Ribstein, supra note 225, at 1436; Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism, supra note 105,
at 1314; Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at 1323.
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Business Roundtable statement may be a reflection of norm bandwagon
and thus the gradual erosion of shareholder primacy in favor of
stakeholderism. Norms also can shift based on the actions of a small group
of defectors, referred to by one scholar as norm cascade.388 Here again,
the embrace of stakeholderism by influential groups including the
Business Roundtable and institutional investors such as BlackRock and
State Street may be a signal of a norm cascade. Whether viewed as a norm
bandwagon or norm cascade, the Business Roundtable statement may
reflect a normative shift that helps set the stage for internalization of the
stakeholder norm. In addition, the push to adopt reforms aimed at more
firmly establishing stakeholderism may be yet another sign of a normative
shift that serves to promote norm internalization. This push may be all the
more significant because it comes from a variety of different sources and
thus furthers the norm cascade or norm bandwagon effect signaled by the
Business Roundtable statement itself. As a result, the cumulative impact
of reforms may help set the stage for norm internalization related to
stakeholderism.
3. Visibility and Repeated Exposure to Stakeholderism
The cumulative effect of reforms, along with the discourse around
reforms, may facilitate norm internalization by promoting visible,
consistent, and repeated exposure to the stakeholder norm. Scholars have
insisted that visibility and repeated exposure to a norm facilitate norm
internalization.389 Because reforms individually and collectively
represent a repeated emphasis on stakeholderism from a variety of
different sources and in a variety of different contexts, the impact of those
reforms is to generate visibility and repeated exposure in a manner that
may contribute to an environment where norm internalization can
occur.390 The cumulative nature of the reforms is even more important
because the reforms impact governance mechanisms that are linked and
thus reinforce one another and, by extension, reinforce the normative
388
See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 19, at 909; see also Bicchieri & Funcke, supra
note 381, at 19; Feldman, supra note 378, at 50; Eisenberg, supra note 350, at 1264 (explaining
that norms can shift after defection of a few influential actors).
389
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2026, 2031; Ellickson, supra note
345, at 167–68.
390
See Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 2; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 362–63 (1997); Eisenberg,
supra note 350, at 1264 (discussing critical mass and tipping).
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preference for stakeholderism across the corporate sphere. This
reinforcement provides added visibility that may serve to enhance the
potential for norm internalization. Indeed, reforms centered on fiduciary
duty, executive compensation, and SEC disclosure strike at the most
critical incentive structures in the corporate ecosystem.391 Even Bebchuk
has acknowledged that the pressure to conform to norms plays an
important role in executive compensation and other critical corporate
governance arrangements.392 By seeking to alter those norms, reforms not
only signal a shift away from shareholder primacy but also bring
important visibility and exposure that may enhance the potential for norm
internalization.
4. Following the Leaders on Stakeholderism
The fact that influential shareholders and asset managers are pushing
for stakeholderism, and that reforms encourage the embrace of
stakeholderism by influential institutions, also may promote norm
internalization. The literature related to norms makes clear that norm
internalization is significantly enhanced when credible, influential, and
powerful leaders embrace the norm.393 Importantly, that literature reveals
that it only takes the embrace of a norm by a few powerful leaders and
influential institutions to facilitate norm internalization.394 Credible
leaders or “trendsetters” serve a vital signaling function that has a strong
impact on setting expectations and thus facilitating norm
internalization.395 The literature therefore suggests that the influential
shareholders and asset managers pushing for stakeholderism may operate
to promote norm internalization. Moreover, the institutions associated
with reforms—particularly the SEC and corporate boards—may serve an
important signaling function that facilitates norm internalization.
***
391

See Eisenberg, supra note 350, at 1264–66, 1278 (discussing normative roles played by
fiduciary law and boards).
392
See Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power, supra note 304, at 794.
393
See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2034 (importance of norm
entrepreneurs); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 19, at 919 (source can be supportive or
disqualifying).
394
See Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 2; Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 77 (explaining
that norms can be imposed by a powerful authority or person); Gavrilets & Richerson, supra
note 345, at 6068; Feldman, supra note 378, at 50.
395
See Bicchieri & Funcke, supra note 381, at 2–6 (discussing reference networks, “first
movers,” and trendsetters).
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These observations suggest that while there may be credible
commitment hurdles with each individual reform, the cumulative effect
of the reforms may promote norm internalization and thereby increase the
possibility that corporate actions align with stakeholderism. If reforms
facilitate norm internalization, they also facilitate credible commitment
because norm internalization helps ensure that we can rely on corporate
actors to exercise their discretion in a manner that ensures norm
compliance.396 Norm internalization is especially significant because of
its potential to counteract concerns about vagueness and trade-offs.
Hence, if reforms can facilitate norm internalization, they can help
facilitate credible commitment to stakeholderism.
E. Normative Challenges
To be sure, there are several factors that pose challenges for norm
internalization related to stakeholderism. First, there is limited research
surrounding how norms are created and disrupted, and thus there is a
decided lack of clarity around understanding and promoting norm
internalization.397 Indeed, much of the norm research has focused on the
observable impacts of norms without consistent focus on the factors that
facilitate norm development.398 As a result, we have limited
understanding of the norm internalization process.399 To be sure, as the
discussion in Section IV.D above illuminates, scholars have identified
factors they believe promote norm development and internalization.400
However, the research in this area is less robust than those focused on the
396

See Ellickson, supra note 345, at 184–85 (discussing norms involved in being a good
neighbor). For examples of social norms, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1135 (2000) (norms of fairness); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 19,
at 914 (norms of good manners); Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 341, at 2030
(norms of courtesy); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1496–97 (1998) (norms of fairness).
397
See Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 1 (noting that why and how norms are created and
internalized remains an open and difficult question); Feldman, supra note 378, at 52
(“Empirical research on norm development and enforcement has substantially lagged
descriptive and theoretical work.”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of)
Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 809 (1998) (noting that a specific definition
of norm remains elusive); McAdams, supra note 390, at 352–54 (explaining that the origins
of norms remain a puzzle); Eisenberg, supra note 350, at 1262.
398
See supra note 397.
399
See supra note 397.
400
See supra notes 378–81 and accompanying text.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1238

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1163

link between norms and behavioral compliance. This more limited
research could hinder our ability to understand how best to facilitate
reforms that can generate norm internalization.
Second, the strength of the shareholder primacy norm may undermine
the feasibility of norm internalization related to stakeholderism. Scholars
have emphasized the considerable difficulty of altering pre-existing
norms.401 Once a norm is in place, people will adhere to it and defend it
even if it is costly or inefficient.402 The considerable legal and extralegal
factors supporting the shareholder primacy norm may make altering the
normative environment appear to be a heavy lift.403 Of course, many
scholars have argued that the strength of the shareholder primacy norm
has been greatly exaggerated, suggesting that disrupting that norm may
not be as challenging as some predict.404 However, the relative dominance
of the shareholder primacy norm may make internalizing a norm that runs
counter to shareholder primacy relatively difficult.
Third, available research raises questions about whether norms can
take root in the corporate environment. Indeed, there is disagreement
regarding whether norms impact corporate behavior. Some corporate
scholars have suggested that norms do not play a significant role in
shaping corporate behavior.405 Others have suggested that norms only
impact behavior under specific conditions or with respect to certain types
of transactions that are not relevant to this Article’s inquiry.406 Indeed,
401

See Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild, supra note 19, at 16; Bicchieri, The Grammar of
Society, supra note 19, at 47–48.
402
See Gavrilets & Richerson, supra note 345, at 6068 (explaining that people ignore costs
they incur when following existing norms and are often willing to pay high costs to defend
existing norms); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1697, 1711–13 (1996) (arguing that norms are persistent even when they are suboptimal
because of several factors including information costs and lags); Posner, supra note 19, at 8.
403
See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 1, at 104–06; Lund, supra note 17, at 1619–20;
Strine, supra note 365, at 776–77.
404
See Blair & Stout, supra note 350, at 1735; Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism, supra note
105, at 1312–14; Fisch & Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, supra note 1, at
1323 (noting that “corporations currently have the power—and indeed the obligation—to
consider” stakeholder interests).
405
See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1869, 1899 (2001).
406
See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 345, at 135; Badawi, supra note 345, at 12–14;
Ellickson, supra note 345, at 9–10; Cooter, supra note 19, at 1664 (comparing social norms
with laws); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349, 356 (1981) (discussing
barriers to entry for non-ethnically homogenous outsiders and the strategies they may
undertake, such as increased reputational credit).
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research suggests that norms are most likely to emerge in insular networks
with high frequency transactions.407 Such research therefore suggests that
norms may be difficult to facilitate for large public corporations.408 While
many corporate scholars insist that norms are relevant for all forms of
corporate behavior,409 this kind of research begs the question about the
viability of norm internalization related to stakeholderism.
Fourth, norm internalization may prove challenging if there are
significant incidents of non-compliance with stakeholderism. Research
suggests that norm internalization is significantly undermined by the lack
of visible compliance with, and enforcement of, particular norms.410 If
corporations fail to comply with the commitments associated with
stakeholderism, or are not held accountable for their lack of compliance,
their actions run the risk of undermining norm internalization.411 In
addition, if corporate actors fail to signal disapproval of those who violate
the stakeholderism norm, this failure also reduces the likelihood that
individual actors within the corporation will feel compelled to align their
behaviors with stakeholderism.412 Moreover, research reveals that this
lack of compliance with norms can generate perceptions of corporate
hypocrisy, causing actors within and outside of the corporation to doubt
the credibility of corporate actors as well as the sincerity of the professed
norm.413 This doubt undermines the likelihood of norm internalization. In
this regard, if corporations embrace stakeholderism without visible
compliance along with visible disapproval of norm violators, those
actions may hinder norm internalization.

407

See, e.g., Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 345, at 135; Badawi, supra note 345, at 12–
14; Ellickson, supra note 345, at 9–10; Cooter, supra note 19, at 1664; Barak D. Richman,
Stateless Commerce: The Diamond Network and the Persistence of Relational Exchange 105–
06 (2017); Landa, supra note 406, at 356 (explaining that high transaction costs incentivize
personalistic markets).
408
Research related to norm creation has focused on insular networks. See Badawi, supra
note 345, at 12–14; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 345, at 135; Ellickson, supra note 345,
at 9–10; Cooter, supra note 19, at 1664; Landa, supra note 406, at 356. Such research,
therefore, may suggest that norm creation may prove more difficult in settings that are not
insular or relatively close-knit such as a large corporation.
409
See supra note 350.
410
See Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 77; Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 2; Feldman,
supra note 378, at 52; Coffee, supra note 350, at 2177.
411
See Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 77; Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 2.
412
See Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 77; Villatoro et al., supra note 378, at 2 (explaining
that violations of a norm may indicate that the norm is losing importance).
413
See Wagner et al., supra note 293, at 83; Parella, supra note 293, at 926–32.
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Fifth, scholars disagree about the extent to which norms can take root
when commitments are overly vague. Some scholars suggest that
vagueness is a hindrance to norm internalization.414 Others insist that
norm internalization ameliorates vagueness concerns.415 This
disagreement begs an important question about whether norms are the
problem or the solution with respect to credible commitment to
stakeholderism.
Finally, it is important to note that norms are not a kind of magic elixir.
Neither the prevalence of a norm nor norm internalization guarantees
norm compliance. Instead, research suggests that even when norms are
created, there are many instances of non-compliance, and thus there is no
guarantee that the entire solution to the credible commitment problem is
norms.416 Indeed, norm violations coexist with norm compliance.417 In
this regard, norms, and the potential for norm internalization, cannot be
the entire answer to the problem of credible commitment.
To be sure, this Article does not seek to use norms and the potential for
norm internalization related to stakeholderism to over-simplify the
problems associated with credible commitment. However, this Article
does insist that the cumulative impact of reforms may facilitate norm
internalization in a manner that increases the likelihood that
stakeholderism can take root in the corporate ecosystem. As a result, those
reforms may be valuable even if they have significant credible
commitment flaws.

414

See, e.g., Polaris, supra note 195, at 252.
See Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance, supra note 200, at 65, 69 (arguing that
vagueness is not inconsistent with norms because norms allow for some evaluative judgment;
norms provide input that directs judgment and discretion); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
206–07 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that norms consist of general standards which “must be
intelligible and within the capacity of most to obey”); Raban, supra note 196, at 188–89
(noting that bright-line legal rules can lead to vague outcomes, especially when attempting to
replicate social norms); Kaplow, supra note 194, at 570; Posner, supra note 195, at 116.
416
See Gavrilets & Richerson, supra note 345, at 6068 (explaining that virtually all norms
can be violated under appropriate conditions); Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 70 (noting
that norm violations are pervasive); Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 72 (discussing how
norms’ obligatory character varies).
417
See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 19, at 918; Gavrilets & Richerson, supra note
345, at 6068 (noting that virtually all norms can be violated under appropriate conditions);
Rueschemeyer, supra note 345, at 70–72 (norm violations are pervasive).
415
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CONCLUSION
There is significant rhetoric from the most influential actors in the
business arena about the importance of social purpose and advancing the
interests of all corporate stakeholders. This rhetoric posits that
stakeholderism is better suited to the long-term health of the corporation,
financial and otherwise.
This rhetoric has been challenged as empty, and perhaps even
opportunistic, talk. Challengers certainly have valid concerns: this
rhetoric is not new; it also never appears to gain legitimacy or
prominence. Moreover, in the past there have been significant gaps
between rhetoric and reality as it relates to commitments involving other
stakeholders. These concerns beg the question whether the recent rise in
rhetoric will lead to changed behavior.
This Article is mindful of such concerns, but nevertheless offers some
reasons for optimism. Many influential shareholders and actors in the
corporate arena have embraced stakeholderism, and these actors have
displayed a willingness to use their influence to pressure corporations
around stakeholder-centered issues. In this regard, the stage may be set
for finally moving the needle on stakeholderism.
However, without a credible commitment, the stage may remain
empty, and hence corporations may not be able to take advantage of the
opportunity presented by this most recent embrace of stakeholderism.
This Article not only highlights the difficulties involved with credible
commitment in this area but also illuminates the challenges associated
with overcoming those difficulties through some of the more familiar
credible commitment vehicles. Although the collection of commitment
vehicles may facilitate norm internalization and thus credible
commitment, the challenging nature of even that endeavor should be
recognized.
To be sure, this Article insists that we should remain committed to
addressing credible commitment problems. At the very least, the
increased rhetoric around stakeholderism reflects a growing consensus
that stakeholderism is the most appropriate theory of corporate purpose.
Hence, identifying ways in which corporations can credibly commit to
that theory is clearly worth the effort.

